linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users

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Message-ID: <1292649765.10804.42.camel@dan>
Date:	Sat, 18 Dec 2010 00:22:44 -0500
From:	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
To:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	jmorris@...ei.org, eugeneteo@...nel.org, kees.cook@...onical.com,
	mingo@...e.hu, davem@...emloft.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from
 unprivileged users

On Fri, 2010-12-17 at 17:22 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 17 Dec 2010 20:12:39 -0500
> Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com> wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > > So what's next?  We need to convert 1,000,000 %p callsites to use %pK? 
> > > That'll be fun.  Please consider adding a new checkpatch rule which
> > > detects %p and asks people whether they should have used %pK.
> > 
> > The goal of this format specifier is specifically for pointers that are
> > exposed to unprivileged users.  I agree that hiding all kernel pointers
> > would be nice, but I don't expect the angry masses to ever agree to
> > that.  For now, I'll isolate specific cases, especially in /proc, that
> > are clear risks in terms of information leakage.  I'll also be skipping
> > over pointers written to the syslog, since I think hiding that
> > information is dmesg_restrict's job.
> 
> Well...  some administrators may wish to hide the pointer values even
> for privileged callers.  That's a pretty trivial add-on for the code
> which you have, and means that those admins can also suppress the
> pointers for IRQ-time callers.  More /proc knobs :)
> 

I can add a "2" setting that hides %pK pointers regardless of privilege
level, which I agree is a useful option.  But because it would be built
into the same format specifier, you still couldn't use %pK in interrupt
context (in case the sysctl wasn't set to 2).

> Then again, perhaps those admins would be OK if we simply disabled
> plain old %p everywhere.  In which case we're looking at a separate
> patch, I suggest.  

I would be happy to do this from a security perspective, but I'd imagine
there's a pretty high risk of things breaking by doing such a sweeping
change.

-Dan

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