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Message-ID: <1293025688.3027.82.camel@edumazet-laptop>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2010 14:48:08 +0100
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
jmorris@...ei.org, tgraf@...radead.org, eugeneteo@...nel.org,
kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net,
a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
eparis@...isplace.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers
Le mercredi 22 décembre 2010 à 08:13 -0500, Dan Rosenberg a écrit :
> > Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused by
> > this?
> >
> > We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by
> > default) - they are not worth much if they are not.
> >
>
> I agree entirely, but I've received a lot of resistance to these types
> of changes in net. I'm afraid that if it's enabled by default, no one
> will actually allow use of the %pK specifier where it should be used.
>
Actually, "net resistance" was against your first patches, using quick
and dirty techniques (Should I remind you some of them ?)
Now you have a helper, it should be easier to integrate the changes.
At least, if a mission critical legacy app want to see real pointers
values and a 2.6.38 kernel, it is a matter of sysadmin tweaks.
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