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Message-ID: <20110120211939.GA32262@dumpdata.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2011 16:19:39 -0500
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
To: matthieu castet <castet.matthieu@...e.fr>
Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...citrix.com>,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>,
"keir.fraser@...citrix.com" <keir.fraser@...citrix.com>,
"mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
"sliakh.lkml@...il.com" <sliakh.lkml@...il.com>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"rusty@...tcorp.com.au" <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
"torvalds@...ux-foundation.org" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"ak@....de" <ak@....de>, "davej@...hat.com" <davej@...hat.com>,
"jiang@...ncsu.edu" <jiang@...ncsu.edu>,
"arjan@...radead.org" <arjan@...radead.org>,
"tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"sfr@...b.auug.org.au" <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
"mingo@...e.hu" <mingo@...e.hu>,
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@...onical.com>
Subject: Re: [tip:x86/security] x86: Add NX protection for kernel data
On Thu, Jan 20, 2011 at 04:04:36PM -0500, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 20, 2011 at 09:23:07PM +0100, matthieu castet wrote:
> > Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk a écrit :
> > >On Thu, Jan 20, 2011 at 03:37:36PM +0000, Ian Campbell wrote:
> > >>On Thu, 2011-01-20 at 15:06 +0000, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > >>>On Thu, Jan 20, 2011 at 12:18:26PM +0100, castet.matthieu@...e.fr wrote:
> > >>>>Quoting Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>:
> > >>>>
> > >>>>>On Wed, Jan 19, 2011 at 11:59:57PM +0100, matthieu castet wrote:
> > >>>>>>Le Wed, 19 Jan 2011 16:14:32 -0500,
> > >>>>>>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com> a écrit :
> > >>>>>>>>>I was just shown this[1] on Xen from an Ubuntu bug report[2].
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>[ 1.230382] NX-protecting the kernel data: 3884k
> > >>>>>>>>>[ 1.231002] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
> > >>>>>>>>>c1782ae0 ...
> > >>>>>>>>>[ 1.231145] Call Trace:
> > >>>>>>>>>[ 1.231152] [<c0138481>] ? __change_page_attr+0x2c1/0x370
> > >>>>>>>>>[ 1.231161] [<c02163a1>] ? __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0xc1/0x180
> > >>>>>>>>>[ 1.231169] [<c013857c>] ?
> > >>>>>>>>>__change_page_attr_set_clr+0x4c/0xb0 [ 1.231176]
> > >>>>>>>>>[<c0138838>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x128/0x300
> > >>>>>>>>>[ 1.231183] [<c010798e>] ?
> > >>>>>>>>>__raw_callee_save_xen_restore_fl+0x6/0x8 [ 1.231192]
> > >>>>>>>>>[<c0159ca1>] ? vprintk+0x171/0x3f0 [ 1.231198] [<c0138bdf>] ?
> > >>>>>>>>>set_memory_nx+0x5f/0x70
> > >>>>>>>>If you run it with Xen debugging enabled:
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>[ 7.753329] NX-protecting the kernel data: 2400k
> > >>>>>>>>(XEN) mm.c:2389:d0 Bad type (saw 3c000003 != exp 70000000) for mfn
> > >>>>>>this happen if (x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_pae_xen_l2)) != type)
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>but
> > >>>>>>#define PGT_type_mask (7U<<29) /* Bits 29-31. */
> > >>>>>>#define _PGT_pae_xen_l2 26
> > >>>>>>#define PGT_pae_xen_l2 (1U<<_PGT_pae_xen_l2)
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>but (exp type = 0x70000000) & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_pae_xen_l2) =
> > >>>>>>0x60000000
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>So the exp type look strange.
> > >>>>>>#define _PGT_pinned 28
> > >>>>>>#define PGT_pinned (1U<<_PGT_pinned)
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>1355a5 (pfn 15a5) (XEN) mm.c:889:d0 Error getting mfn 1355a5 (pfn
> > >>>>>>>>15a5) from L1 entry 80000001355a5063 for l1e_owner=0, pg_owner=0
> > >>>>>>>>(XEN) mm.c:4958:d0 ptwr_emulate: could not get_page_from_l1e()
> > >>>>>>>>[ 7.759087] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
> > >>>>>>>>c82a4d28 [ 7.759087] IP: [<c100608c>]
> > >>>>>>>>xen_set_pte_atomic+0x21/0x2f [ 7.759087] *pdpt =
> > >>>>>>>>0000000001663001 *pde = 00000000082db067 *pte = 80000000082a4061 ..
> > >>>>>>>>and same stack trace.
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>Does Xen have different size page table allocations or something
> > >>>>>>>>>weird?
> > >>>>>>>>The same page size. Not sure actually why it is being triggered.
> > >>>>>>>>Let me copy Keir on this. Keir, the region that is being marked as
> > >>>>>>>>_NX is .bss one and
> > >>>>>>>_past_ the __init_end it dies. Any ideas?
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>Does this happen if you add ". = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);" before bss section
> > >>>>>>in arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S ?
> > >>>>>Like this?
> > >>>>Yes
> > >>>>>yeeeey...That made it boot.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>>What's the output of kernel_page_tables debugfs ?
> > >>>>>Shees.. I get
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>[ 73.723105] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 15555000
> > >>>>[...]
> > >>>>>with the patch and if I revert 5bd5a452662bc37c54fb6828db1a3faf87e6511c..
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>That looks to be another bug to hunt down.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>No that the same bug : that the root cause.
> > >>>>
> > >>>>For some reason with xen, accessing some page tables (bss and after) make the
> > >>>>system crash.
> > >>>I think I know the failure in the first case - the swapper_pg_dir is marked as _RO
> > >>>and you are not suppose to make it _RW (unless you first do a bit of dance and switch
> > >>>over to another pagetable). The reason being that Xen has a symbiotic relationship
> > >>>with PV domains where pagetables are marked _RO so that any update to
> > >>>it will go through Xen so it can validate that we aren't doing anything stupid.
> > >>>
> > >>>But accessing the page table should be OK, not sure why it crashed - we
> > >>>aren't writting anything to it - just reading.
> > >>>
> > >>>Let me copy Ian on this - he might have better ideas.
> > >>It's pretty hard to follow the quoted context above but it certainly
> > >>seems plausible that set_memory_nx could inadvertently end up trying to
> > >>make a page which Xen made RO into a RW again.
> > >>
> > >>For example the callchain appear to pass through static_protections()
> > >>which explicitly makes .data and .bss writeable, I think these regions
> > >>can potentially contain page table pages -- e.g. allocated from BRK
> > >>perhaps?
> > >
> > >They definitly do - it has the level1_ident_pgt, which is definitly used
> > >during bootup.
> > >
> > Ok that make sense
> > >Perhaps the fix is when marking NX, just do NX, don't try to set RW if they
> > >are RO.
> > >
> > What do you think of this patch ?
> >
> >
> > Matthieu
>
> > >From 928dabe66cc5992587eb70410208ca9885c64a5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > From: Matthieu CASTET <castet.matthieu@...e.fr>
> > Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2011 21:11:45 +0100
> > Subject: [PATCH] NX protection for kernel data : support xen
> >
> > Xen want page table pages read only.
> >
> > But the initial page table (from head_*.S) live in .data or .bss.
> > Don't make static_protections enforce rw for .data/.bss in xen case.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Matthieu CASTET <castet.matthieu@...e.fr>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 5 ++++-
> > 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> > index 8b830ca..8698521 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> > @@ -283,11 +283,14 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
> > __pa((unsigned long)__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
> > pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
> > /*
> > - * .data and .bss should always be writable.
> > + * .data and .bss should always be writable, but xen won't like
> > + * if we make page table rw (that live in .data or .bss)
> > */
> > +#ifndef CONFIG_XEN
> > if (within(address, (unsigned long)_sdata, (unsigned long)_edata) ||
> > within(address, (unsigned long)__bss_start, (unsigned long)__bss_stop))
> > pgprot_val(required) |= _PAGE_RW;
> > +#endif
>
> <shudders>There has to be a better way than this. Keep in mind that this
> would mean that any kernel that runs with the pvops turned on (pretty much all distros)
> will do this. You don't need anymore to build a kernel that is Xen specific - it is
> one kernel that can run on baremetal, Xen, etc.
>
> Is there no way to just say, pass in PAGE_NX and don't unset the other
> permissions? Hmm, there is something right below what your patch does:
>
> if (kernel_set_to_readonly &&
> within(address, (unsigned long)_text,
> (unsigned long)__end_rodata_hpage_align)) {
> unsigned int level;
>
> ...
> * This also fixes the Linux Xen paravirt guest boot failure
> * (because of unexpected read-only mappings for kernel identity
> * mappings). In this paravirt guest case, the kernel text
> ...
>
>
> Could we just expand the search criteria to be __end ?
This seems to work, which is just a copy-n-paste of what X86_64 does. Not sure
thought if it is correct.
commit 9ea22c7cb9bf00617dc53f2fb3d3f55a1d55b0f8
Author: matthieu castet <castet.matthieu@...e.fr>
Date: Thu Jan 20 21:23:07 2011 +0100
[PATCH] NX protection for kernel data : support xen
Xen want page table pages read only.
But the initial page table (from head_*.S) live in .data or .bss.
Don't make static_protections enforce rw for .data/.bss in xen case.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu CASTET <castet.matthieu@...e.fr>
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index 8b830ca..524dba2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -283,11 +283,17 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
__pa((unsigned long)__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
/*
- * .data and .bss should always be writable.
+ * .data and .bss should always be writable, but xen won't like
+ * if we make page table rw (that live in .data or .bss)
*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
if (within(address, (unsigned long)_sdata, (unsigned long)_edata) ||
- within(address, (unsigned long)__bss_start, (unsigned long)__bss_stop))
- pgprot_val(required) |= _PAGE_RW;
+ within(address, (unsigned long)__bss_start, (unsigned long)__bss_stop)) {
+ unsigned int level;
+ if (lookup_address(address, &level) && (level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
+ pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
+ }
+#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
fyi, it does make it boot.
/*
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