linux-kernel - Re: [tip:x86/security] x86: Add NX protection for kernel data

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2011 15:27:39 +0100
From:	matthieu castet <castet.matthieu@...e.fr>
To:	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
CC:	Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...citrix.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
	Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>,
	"keir.fraser@...citrix.com" <keir.fraser@...citrix.com>,
	"mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
	"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"sliakh.lkml@...il.com" <sliakh.lkml@...il.com>,
	"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"rusty@...tcorp.com.au" <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
	"torvalds@...ux-foundation.org" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"ak@....de" <ak@....de>, "davej@...hat.com" <davej@...hat.com>,
	"jiang@...ncsu.edu" <jiang@...ncsu.edu>,
	"arjan@...radead.org" <arjan@...radead.org>,
	"tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	"sfr@...b.auug.org.au" <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
	"mingo@...e.hu" <mingo@...e.hu>,
	Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@...onical.com>, konrad@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [tip:x86/security] x86: Add NX protection for kernel data

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk a écrit :
> On Fri, Jan 21, 2011 at 10:41:54PM +0100, matthieu castet wrote:
>> Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk a écrit :
>>>> -	 * .data and .bss should always be writable.
>>>> +	 * .data and .bss should always be writable, but xen won't like
>>>> +	 * if we make page table rw (that live in .data or .bss)
>>>>  	 */
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>>>>  	if (within(address, (unsigned long)_sdata, (unsigned long)_edata) ||
>>>> -	    within(address, (unsigned long)__bss_start, (unsigned long)__bss_stop))
>>>> -		pgprot_val(required) |= _PAGE_RW;
>>>> +	    within(address, (unsigned long)__bss_start, (unsigned long)__bss_stop)) {
>>>> +		unsigned int level;
>>>> +		if (lookup_address(address, &level) && (level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
>>>> +			pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
>>>> +	}
>>>> +#endif
>>>>   #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
>>>>
>>>> fyi, it does make it boot.
>>> Hold it.. ccache is a wonderful tool but I think I've just "rebuilt" the
>>> binaries with the .bss HPAGE_ALIGN aligment by mistake, so this path got never
>>> taken.
>>>
>>>
>> Ok,
>>
>> ATM I saw the following solution to solve the problem :
>> 1) remove the data/bss check in static_protections, it was introduced by NX patches (64edc8ed). But I am not sure it
>> is really needed anymore.
>> 2) add ". = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE)" somewhere after init section. But if we want not to be allocated in image we
>> should put it before bss. And if we want to be freed after init, we should put before .init.end.
>> This mean moving .smp_locks (and .data_nosave when x86 will be added) before init section. I have no idea of the impact.
>> 3) add some logic in arch/x86/xen/mmu.c, that will ignore RW page setting for the page table marked RO.
>> 4) make static_protections take and old_prot argument, and only apply RW .data/.bss requirement if page is already RW.
>>
>> If possible I will go for 1).
> 
> Sounds good. Just send me the patch and I will test it.

Ok, what give you the attached patch.

I don't know if I should give the printk or not.


Matthieu

View attachment "xen_nx.diff" of type "text/x-diff" (1419 bytes)