linux-kernel - [PATCH -V26 14/16] fs: limit linkat syscall with null relative name to CAP_DAC_READ

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <1296328099-23263-15-git-send-email-aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:	Sun, 30 Jan 2011 00:38:17 +0530
From:	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	hch@...radead.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, adilger@....com,
	corbet@....net, neilb@...e.de, npiggin@...nel.dk,
	hooanon05@...oo.co.jp, bfields@...ldses.org, miklos@...redi.hu
Cc:	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, sfrench@...ibm.com,
	philippe.deniel@....FR, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH -V26 14/16] fs: limit linkat syscall with null relative name to CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH

We don't want to allow creation of private hardlinks by different application
using the fd passed to them via SCM_RIGHTS. So limit the null relative name
usage in linkat syscall to CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH

Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 fs/namei.c |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 990b155..5c4902c 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3408,6 +3408,18 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de
 	return error;
 }
 
+static int null_name(const char __user *name)
+{
+	int retval = 0;
+	char *tmp = getname_null(name);
+	if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
+		if (*tmp == 0)
+			retval = 1;
+	}
+	putname(tmp);
+	return retval;
+}
+
 /*
  * Hardlinks are often used in delicate situations.  We avoid
  * security-related surprises by not following symlinks on the
@@ -3428,6 +3440,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(linkat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname,
 
 	if ((flags & ~AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * To use null names we require CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
+	 * This ensures that not everyone will be able to create
+	 * handlink using the passed filedescriptor.
+	 */
+	if (null_name(oldname)) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+			return -ENOENT;
+	}
 
 	error = user_path_at(olddfd, oldname,
 			     flags & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW ? LOOKUP_FOLLOW : 0,
-- 
1.7.1

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/