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Message-ID: <4D4683A9.8050400@suse.cz>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 10:40:57 +0100
From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To: Kacper Kornet <kornet@...k.edu.pl>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...nel.org
Subject: [for .36,.37 stable] Re: [PATCH v2] Fix prlimit64 for suid/sgid processes
Ccing stable.
Merged as aa5bd67dcfdf9 and should go into:
->.36-stable (if maintained still)
->.37-stable
On 01/29/2011 12:21 AM, Kacper Kornet wrote:
> Since check_prlimit_permission always fails in the case of SUID/GUID
> processes, such processes are not able to read or set their own limits.
> This commit changes this by assuming that process can always read/change
> its own limits.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kacper Kornet <kornet@...k.edu.pl>
> ---
> kernel/sys.c | 3 ++-
> 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index e9ad444..03bead7 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -1375,7 +1375,8 @@ static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task)
> const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
>
> tcred = __task_cred(task);
> - if ((cred->uid != tcred->euid ||
> + if (current != task &&
> + (cred->uid != tcred->euid ||
> cred->uid != tcred->suid ||
> cred->uid != tcred->uid ||
> cred->gid != tcred->egid ||
thanks,
--
js
suse labs
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