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Message-ID: <AANLkTi=wyaLP6gFmNxajp+HtYu3B9_KGf2o4BnYA+rwy@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2011 16:27:28 -0500
From: Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, hughd@...gle.com,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tmpfs: implement security.capability xattrs
Bueller? Bueller? Any thoughts? Any problems?
On Tue, Jan 11, 2011 at 4:07 PM, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> wrote:
> This patch implements security.capability xattrs for tmpfs filesystems. The
> feodra project, while trying to replace suid apps with file capabilities,
> realized that tmpfs, which is used on my build systems, does not support file
> capabilities and thus cannot be used to build packages which use file
> capabilities. The patch only implements security.capability but there is no
> reason it could not be easily expanded to support *.* xattrs as most of the
> work is already done. I don't know what other xattrs are in use in the world
> or if they necessarily make sense on tmpfs so I didn't make this
> implementation completely generic.
>
> The basic implementation is that I attach a
> struct shmem_xattr {
> struct list_head list; /* anchored by shmem_inode_info->xattr_list */
> char *name;
> size_t size;
> char value[0];
> };
> Into the struct shmem_inode_info for each xattr that is set. Since I only
> allow security.capability obviously this list is only every 0 or 1 entry long.
> I could have been a little simpler, but then the next person having to
> implement an xattr would have to redo everything I did instead of me just
> doing 90% of their work :)
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
> ---
>
> include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 8 +++
> mm/shmem.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> index 399be5a..6f2ebb8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> @@ -9,6 +9,13 @@
>
> #define SHMEM_NR_DIRECT 16
>
> +struct shmem_xattr {
> + struct list_head list; /* anchored by shmem_inode_info->xattr_list */
> + char *name;
> + size_t size;
> + char value[0];
> +};
> +
> struct shmem_inode_info {
> spinlock_t lock;
> unsigned long flags;
> @@ -19,6 +26,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info {
> struct page *i_indirect; /* top indirect blocks page */
> swp_entry_t i_direct[SHMEM_NR_DIRECT]; /* first blocks */
> struct list_head swaplist; /* chain of maybes on swap */
> + struct list_head xattr_list; /* list of shmem_xattr */
> struct inode vfs_inode;
> };
>
> diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
> index 86cd21d..d2bacd6 100644
> --- a/mm/shmem.c
> +++ b/mm/shmem.c
> @@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ static int shmem_notify_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
> static void shmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
> {
> struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
> + struct shmem_xattr *xattr, *nxattr;
>
> if (inode->i_mapping->a_ops == &shmem_aops) {
> truncate_inode_pages(inode->i_mapping, 0);
> @@ -834,6 +835,9 @@ static void shmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
> mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
> }
> }
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(xattr, nxattr, &info->xattr_list, list)
> + kfree(xattr);
> BUG_ON(inode->i_blocks);
> shmem_free_inode(inode->i_sb);
> end_writeback(inode);
> @@ -1597,6 +1601,7 @@ static struct inode *shmem_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, const struct inode
> spin_lock_init(&info->lock);
> info->flags = flags & VM_NORESERVE;
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->swaplist);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->xattr_list);
> cache_no_acl(inode);
>
> switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
> @@ -2071,24 +2076,123 @@ static size_t shmem_xattr_security_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *list,
> size_t list_len, const char *name,
> size_t name_len, int handler_flags)
> {
> - return security_inode_listsecurity(dentry->d_inode, list, list_len);
> + struct shmem_xattr *xattr;
> + struct shmem_inode_info *shmem_i;
> + size_t used;
> + char *buf = NULL;
> +
> + used = security_inode_listsecurity(dentry->d_inode, list, list_len);
> +
> + shmem_i = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode);
> + if (list)
> + buf = list + used;
> +
> + spin_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(xattr, &shmem_i->xattr_list, list) {
> + size_t len = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
> + len += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
> + if (list_len - (used + len) >= 0 && buf) {
> + strncpy(buf, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN);
> + buf += XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
> + strncpy(buf, xattr->name, strlen(xattr->name) + 1);
> + buf += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
> + }
> + used += len;
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_lock);
> +
> + return used;
> }
>
> static int shmem_xattr_security_get(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> void *buffer, size_t size, int handler_flags)
> {
> + struct shmem_inode_info *shmem_i;
> + struct shmem_xattr *xattr;
> + int ret;
> +
> if (strcmp(name, "") == 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - return xattr_getsecurity(dentry->d_inode, name, buffer, size);
> +
> + ret = xattr_getsecurity(dentry->d_inode, name, buffer, size);
> + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + return ret;
> +
> + /* if we make this generic this needs to go... */
> + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + ret = -ENODATA;
> + shmem_i = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode);
> +
> + spin_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(xattr, &shmem_i->xattr_list, list) {
> + if (!strcmp(name, xattr->name)) {
> + ret = xattr->size;
> + if (buffer) {
> + if (size < xattr->size)
> + ret = -ERANGE;
> + else
> + memcpy(buffer, xattr->value, xattr->size);
> + }
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_lock);
> + return ret;
> }
>
> static int shmem_xattr_security_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> const void *value, size_t size, int flags, int handler_flags)
> {
> + int ret;
> + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> + struct shmem_inode_info *shmem_i = SHMEM_I(inode);
> + struct shmem_xattr *xattr;
> + struct shmem_xattr *new_xattr;
> + size_t len;
> +
> if (strcmp(name, "") == 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - return security_inode_setsecurity(dentry->d_inode, name, value,
> - size, flags);
> + ret = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags);
> + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + return ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * We only store fcaps for now, but this could be a lot more generic.
> + * We could hold the prefix as well as the suffix in the xattr struct
> + * We would also need to hold a copy of the suffix rather than a
> + * pointer to XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
> + */
> + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + /* wrap around? */
> + len = sizeof(*new_xattr) + size;
> + if (len <= sizeof(*new_xattr))
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + new_xattr = kmalloc(GFP_NOFS, len);
> + if (!new_xattr)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + new_xattr->name = XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX;
> + new_xattr->size = size;
> + memcpy(new_xattr->value, value, size);
> +
> + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(xattr, &shmem_i->xattr_list, list) {
> + if (!strcmp(name, xattr->name)) {
> + list_replace(&xattr->list, &new_xattr->list);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> + list_add(&new_xattr->list, &shmem_i->xattr_list);
> + xattr = NULL;
> +out:
> + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> + kfree(xattr);
> + return 0;
> }
>
> static const struct xattr_handler shmem_xattr_security_handler = {
>
> --
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