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Message-ID: <20110303025802.GB10138@peq.hallyn.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2011 20:58:02 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ch.ncsc.mil>, Nathan Lynch <ntl@...ox.com>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH mmotm 3/3] userns: make has_capability* into real functions
so we can let type safety keep things sane, and as a bonus we can
remove the declaration of init_user_ns in capability.h.
---
include/linux/capability.h | 34 +++-----------------------
kernel/capability.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/capability.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/capability.h 2011-03-03 02:17:17.533467959 +0000
+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/capability.h 2011-03-03 02:26:56.524786760 +0000
@@ -371,8 +371,6 @@
struct dentry;
struct user_namespace;
-extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
-
struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
@@ -541,34 +539,10 @@
cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
}
-/**
- * has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect, false if not.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
- */
-#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)
-
-#define has_ns_capability(t, ns, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (ns), (cap)) == 0)
-
-/**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
- * check.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
- */
-#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
- (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)
-
+extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
Index: linux-2.6/kernel/capability.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/kernel/capability.c 2011-03-03 02:17:17.523467247 +0000
+++ linux-2.6/kernel/capability.c 2011-03-03 02:52:11.652778780 +0000
@@ -291,6 +291,60 @@
}
/**
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+{
+ int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+ int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap);
+
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
+ * audit message for the check.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+{
+ int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/**
* capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
--
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