[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20110311212747.GA27618@outflux.net>
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 13:27:47 -0800
From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@...nel.sg>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH] proc: protect mm start_code/end_code in /proc/pid/stat
While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit
f83ce3e6b02d5e48b3a43b001390e2b58820389d), the start_code and end_code
values were not. This would allow the text location of a PIE binary to
leak, defeating ASLR.
Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value
since "ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take
start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to
Brad Spengler for pointing this out.
CVE-2011-0726
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>
Cc: stable@...nel.org
---
fs/proc/array.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 7c99c1c..5e4f776 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
vsize,
mm ? get_mm_rss(mm) : 0,
rsslim,
- mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
- mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
+ mm ? (permitted ? mm->start_code : 1) : 0,
+ mm ? (permitted ? mm->end_code : 1) : 0,
(permitted && mm) ? mm->start_stack : 0,
esp,
eip,
--
1.7.4.1
--
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists