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Message-Id: <1300045764-24168-11-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca>
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2011 15:49:22 -0400
From: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@...rt.ca>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Michel Lespinasse <walken@...gle.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>,
Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Nick Piggin <npiggin@...nel.dk>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Mel Gorman <mel@....ul.ie>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
x86@...nel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Stephen Wilson <wilsons@...rt.ca>
Subject: [PATCH 10/12] proc: hold cred_guard_mutex in check_mem_permission()
Avoid a potential race when task exec's and we get a new ->mm but check against
the old credentials in ptrace_may_access().
Holding of the mutex is implemented by factoring out the body of the code into a
helper function __check_mem_permission(). Performing this factorization now
simplifies upcoming changes and minimizes churn in the diff's.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@...rt.ca>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index e52702d..f6b644f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -191,10 +191,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
return result;
}
-/*
- * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
- */
-static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+static int __check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
{
/*
* A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
@@ -222,6 +219,27 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
return -EPERM;
}
+/*
+ * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
+ */
+static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * Avoid racing if task exec's as we might get a new mm but validate
+ * against old credentials.
+ */
+ err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = __check_mem_permission(task);
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
--
1.7.3.5
--
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