linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of uninitialized value, and signedness issue

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Message-ID: <1300879405.1935.2.camel@dan>
Date:	Wed, 23 Mar 2011 07:23:25 -0400
From:	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
To:	Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>
Cc:	perex@...ex.cz, alsa-devel@...a-project.org, security@...nel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
 uninitialized value, and signedness issue

On Wed, 2011-03-23 at 08:39 +0100, Takashi Iwai wrote:
> At Tue, 22 Mar 2011 14:31:08 -0400,
> Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> > 
> > The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
> > arbitrary.  If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
> > a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val).  While this will just return
> > -EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
> > Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
> > initialized prior to its use.  Finally, a signed comparison may result
> > in an unintentionally large loop.
> > 
> > This patch fixes all these issues, as well as some cleanup to prevent
> > checkpatch.pl from complaining.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
> > Cc: stable@...nel.org
> 
> Well, the whole load_patch mechanism doesn't look working right with
> ofs != 0.  The only caller of this callback is sound/oss/sequencer.c,
> and it assumes that the whole chunk is passed once without splitting.
> Thus the offset calculation in this code is obviously wrong, and
> passing offset itself doesn't make any sense.
> 
> A similar problem (uninitialized struct fields) is found in another
> load_patch callback in sound/oss/opl3.c.
> 
> That is, the best fix would be to rip off the offset argument from
> this callback.
> 

Thanks, I'll resend a new patch series that uses this approach as well
as addresses a few more security issues.

On a related note, is there any interest in removing OSS (actual, not
emulation) entirely?  It's been marked as deprecated since before the
git epoch (2005), and it's seen little development other than bug fixes
and security issues.

Regards,
Dan

> 
> thanks,
> 
> Takashi
> 
> > ---
> >  sound/oss/midi_synth.c |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
> >  1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/sound/oss/midi_synth.c b/sound/oss/midi_synth.c
> > index 3c09374..3500f80 100644
> > --- a/sound/oss/midi_synth.c
> > +++ b/sound/oss/midi_synth.c
> > @@ -491,16 +491,18 @@ midi_synth_load_patch(int dev, int format, const char __user *addr,
> >  	if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, 0xf0))
> >  		return 0;
> >  
> > +	/* Invalid patch format */
> >  	if (format != SYSEX_PATCH)
> > -	{
> > -/*		  printk("MIDI Error: Invalid patch format (key) 0x%x\n", format);*/
> >  		  return -EINVAL;
> > -	}
> > +
> > +	/* Patch header too short */
> >  	if (count < hdr_size)
> > -	{
> > -/*		printk("MIDI Error: Patch header too short\n");*/
> >  		return -EINVAL;
> > -	}
> > +
> > +	/* Offset too high */
> > +	if (offs > offsetof(struct sysex_info, len) || offs < 0)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> >  	count -= hdr_size;
> >  
> >  	/*
> > @@ -510,14 +512,13 @@ midi_synth_load_patch(int dev, int format, const char __user *addr,
> >  
> >  	if(copy_from_user(&((char *) &sysex)[offs], &(addr)[offs], hdr_size - offs))
> >  		return -EFAULT;
> > - 
> > - 	if (count < sysex.len)
> > -	{
> > -/*		printk(KERN_WARNING "MIDI Warning: Sysex record too short (%d<%d)\n", count, (int) sysex.len);*/
> > +
> > +	/* Sysex record too short */
> > +	if ((unsigned)count < (unsigned)sysex.len)
> >  		sysex.len = count;
> > -	}
> > -  	left = sysex.len;
> > -  	src_offs = 0;
> > +
> > +	left = sysex.len;
> > +	src_offs = 0;
> >  
> >  	for (i = 0; i < left && !signal_pending(current); i++)
> >  	{
> > 
> > 


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