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Message-Id: <1302803039-9400-91-git-send-email-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 13:42:00 -0400
From: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>
To: stable@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: stable-review@...nel.org, Nelson Elhage <nelhage@...lice.com>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>
Subject: [34-longterm 090/209] do_exit(): make sure that we run with get_fs() == USER_DS
From: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@...lice.com>
=====================================================================
| This is a commit scheduled for the next v2.6.34 longterm release. |
| If you see a problem with using this for longterm, please comment.|
=====================================================================
commit 33dd94ae1ccbfb7bf0fb6c692bc3d1c4269e6177 upstream.
If a user manages to trigger an oops with fs set to KERNEL_DS, fs is not
otherwise reset before do_exit(). do_exit may later (via mm_release in
fork.c) do a put_user to a user-controlled address, potentially allowing
a user to leverage an oops into a controlled write into kernel memory.
This is only triggerable in the presence of another bug, but this
potentially turns a lot of DoS bugs into privilege escalations, so it's
worth fixing. I have proof-of-concept code which uses this bug along
with CVE-2010-3849 to write a zero to an arbitrary kernel address, so
I've tested that this is not theoretical.
A more logical place to put this fix might be when we know an oops has
occurred, before we call do_exit(), but that would involve changing
every architecture, in multiple places.
Let's just stick it in do_exit instead.
[akpm@...ux-foundation.org: update code comment]
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@...lice.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>
---
kernel/exit.c | 9 +++++++++
1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index b0242b4..8eb207f 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -911,6 +911,15 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
if (unlikely(!tsk->pid))
panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!");
+ /*
+ * If do_exit is called because this processes oopsed, it's possible
+ * that get_fs() was left as KERNEL_DS, so reset it to USER_DS before
+ * continuing. Amongst other possible reasons, this is to prevent
+ * mm_release()->clear_child_tid() from writing to a user-controlled
+ * kernel address.
+ */
+ set_fs(USER_DS);
+
tracehook_report_exit(&code);
validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
--
1.7.4.4
--
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