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Message-ID: <BANLkTik2Pc=A1b41oNanZ--bsX0OHhbA+w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2011 20:45:17 -0400
From: Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
npiggin@...nel.dk, shaohua.li@...el.com, sds@...ho.nsa.gov,
jmorris@...ei.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe
I'll take a close look over the weekend, but I'm pretty sure this is
even more strict than it needs to be. I looked at this a while ago
and the only RCU unsafe location I could find was in the generic LSM
'audit' code (nothing to do with the audit subsystem). That code can
do a d = d_find_alias(); dput(d). I don't think I realized the dput()
was not RCU safe at the time. We use it to come up with a name of a
dentry that might have caused the denial (although obviously not
necessarily the right name)
I could just drop that piece of functionality (and rely on the audit
subsystem for the info), but I think I'd rather do it your way. I
think I can push your flags a lot deeper than you have pushed them
(and remove them in some places you have included them). Let me look
over the next day or two....
-Eric
On Thu, Apr 21, 2011 at 8:23 PM, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org> wrote:
> From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
>
> Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
> dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
> RCU friendly. selinux already uses RCU for its internal decision
> cache, so this must be already RCU safe.
>
> This patch makes the VFS RCU walk not retry in selinux if it
> hit the cache, and only fallback on a cache miss.
>
> I had to add some parameters to pass the state around, otherwise
> the patch is quite simple.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/avc.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 28 +++++++++++-----------
> security/selinux/include/avc.h | 22 ++++++++++++-----
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index 9da6420..9163c5f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
> * @avd: access vector decisions
> * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
> * @a: auxiliary audit data
> + * @flags: VFS walk flags
> *
> * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
> * with the policy. This function is typically called by
> @@ -481,9 +482,10 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
> * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
> * before calling the auditing code.
> */
> -void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> +int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> - struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
> + struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
> + unsigned flags)
> {
> struct common_audit_data stack_data;
> u32 denied, audited;
> @@ -515,7 +517,18 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> else
> audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
> if (!audited)
> - return;
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry (until
> + * someone makes audit RCU safe)
> + * Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes during
> + * retry. However this is logically just as if the operation happened
> + * a little later.
> + */
> + if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
> + return -ECHILD;
> +
> if (!a) {
> a = &stack_data;
> COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
> @@ -529,6 +542,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
> a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
> common_lsm_audit(a);
> + return 0;
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -726,6 +740,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
> * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
> * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0
> * @avd: access vector decisions
> + * @vfsflags: VFS walk flags
> *
> * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
> * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
> @@ -741,7 +756,8 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
> int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> unsigned flags,
> - struct av_decision *in_avd)
> + struct av_decision *in_avd,
> + unsigned vfsflags)
> {
> struct avc_node *node;
> struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;
> @@ -756,6 +772,10 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> if (!node) {
> rcu_read_unlock();
>
> + /* Try again later if RCU */
> + if (vfsflags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
> + return -ECHILD;
> +
> if (in_avd)
> avd = in_avd;
> else
> @@ -793,6 +813,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> * @tclass: target security class
> * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
> * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
> + * @flags: VFS walk flags
> *
> * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
> * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
> @@ -802,14 +823,21 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
> * another -errno upon other errors.
> */
> -int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> - u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
> +int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> + u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
> + unsigned flags)
> {
> struct av_decision avd;
> - int rc;
> -
> - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
> - avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
> + int rc, rc2;
> +
> + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd,
> + flags);
> + if (rc == -ECHILD)
> + return rc;
> + rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
> + flags);
> + if (rc2 == -ECHILD)
> + return rc2;
> return rc;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index a73f4e4..ea8c755 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1445,9 +1445,12 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
> BUG();
> }
>
> - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
> - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
> - avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
> + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd, 0);
> + if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
> + int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
> + if (rc2 == -ECHILD)
> + return rc2;
> + }
> return rc;
> }
>
> @@ -1467,7 +1470,8 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
> static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
> struct inode *inode,
> u32 perms,
> - struct common_audit_data *adp)
> + struct common_audit_data *adp,
> + unsigned flags)
> {
> struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> @@ -1487,7 +1491,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
> ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
> }
>
> - return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
> + return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
> }
>
> /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
> @@ -1504,7 +1508,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
> COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
> ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
> ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
> - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
> + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
> }
>
> /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
> @@ -1540,7 +1544,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
> /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
> rc = 0;
> if (av)
> - rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
> + rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
>
> out:
> return rc;
> @@ -2103,7 +2107,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
> file = file_priv->file;
> inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
> if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
> - FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
> + FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) {
> drop_tty = 1;
> }
> }
> @@ -2649,10 +2653,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flag
> if (!mask)
> return 0;
>
> - /* May be droppable after audit */
> - if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
> - return -ECHILD;
> -
> COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
> ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
>
> @@ -2661,7 +2661,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flag
>
> perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
>
> - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
> + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
> }
>
> static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
> @@ -3209,7 +3209,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
> * new inode label or new policy.
> * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
> */
> - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
> + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0);
> }
>
> /* task security operations */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> index 5615081..65d6e52 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> @@ -54,21 +54,29 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
>
> void __init avc_init(void);
>
> -void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> +int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> struct av_decision *avd,
> int result,
> - struct common_audit_data *a);
> + struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags);
>
> #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
> int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> unsigned flags,
> - struct av_decision *avd);
> -
> -int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> - u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> - struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
> + struct av_decision *avd, unsigned vfsflags);
> +
> +int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> + u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
> + unsigned);
> +
> +static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> + u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
> +{
> + return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0);
> +}
>
> u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 6ef4af4..4749202 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -2212,7 +2212,7 @@ out_unlock:
> rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
> SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
> PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
> - NULL);
> + NULL, 0);
> if (!rc)
> mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
> cond_resched();
> --
> 1.7.4.2
>
> --
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