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Message-Id: <20110426211312.767883E1887@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2011 14:13:12 -0700 (PDT)
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: segoon@...nwall.com, kaber@...sh.net, gregkh@...e.de,
ak@...ux.intel.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
stable@...nel.org, tim.bird@...sony.com
Subject: [PATCH] [33/106] ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
2.6.35-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream.
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
---
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Index: linux-2.6.35.y/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.35.y.orig/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ linux-2.6.35.y/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -1289,6 +1289,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void _
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -1835,6 +1836,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -2064,6 +2066,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;
if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
target = 1;
--
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