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Message-ID: <20110428162015.GA1927@hallyn.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 11:20:15 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kees.cook@...onical.com, eparis@...hat.com, agl@...omium.org,
mingo@...e.hu, jmorris@...ei.org,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] seccomp_filter: Enable ftrace-based system call
filtering
Quoting Will Drewry (wad@...omium.org):
> >> void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
> >> {
> >> - int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
> >> + int mode = -1;
> >> int * syscall;
> >> -
> >> + /* Do we need an RCU read lock to access current's state? */
> >
> > I'm actually confused to why you are using RCU. What are you protecting.
> > Currently, I see the state is always accessed from current->seccomp. But
> > current should not be fighting with itself.
> >
> > Maybe I'm missing something.
>
> I'm sure it's me that's missing something. I believe the seccomp
> pointer can be accessed from:
> - current
> - via /proc/<pid>/seccomp_filter (read-only)
>
> Given those cases, would it make sense to ditch the RCU interface for it?
ISTM you need them to protect the reader.
-serge
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