Date:	Wed, 27 Apr 2011 19:06:46 -0500
From:	Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc:	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...ito.it>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	dhowells@...hat.com, jmorris@...ei.org, zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
	safford@...son.ibm.com, kirkland@...onical.com,
	ecryptfs-devel@...ts.launchpad.net, eparis@...hat.com,
	sds@...ho.nsa.gov, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] File descriptor labeling

On Wed Apr 27, 2011 at 04:57:42PM -0700, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 4/27/2011 4:27 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> > On Wed Apr 27, 2011 at 01:19:55PM -0700, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >> On 4/27/2011 5:34 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> >>> File descriptor labeling issue
> >>>
> >>> Actually SELinux and SMACK assign to file descriptors the same label of the
> >>> opening process and use it in LSM hooks security_file_permission(),
> >>> security_file_fcntl() and others to verify if the 'current' process has the
> >>> rights to perform the requested operation.
> >>>
> >>> Using the credentials of the 'current' process may be not appropriate in
> >>> case a file descriptor is opened by a kernel service (i.e. a filesystem)
> >>> and made shared among user processes. For instance, in a system with
> >>> SELinux and eCryptfs, if the process A opens an encrypted file, eCryptfs
> >>> obtains a file descriptor to access the correspondent inode in the lower
> >>> filesystem, labeled with the A's label.
> >>>
> >>> If the process B accesses the same encrypted file, it needs the 'use'
> >>> permission on the A's label other than permissions for the lower inode.
> >>> However, if B is the first accessing process, A needs the 'use' permission
> >>> on the B's label.
> >> I am having trouble understanding the argument. I will pose my
> >> question in Smack terms, as I can speak most definitively in them.
> >>
> >> A process running with a Smack label "A" creates a file, and that
> >> file gets labeled "A", as it ought. If eCryptfs is behaving correctly
> >> this ought not change. If eCryptfs in encrypting the label it needs
> >> to do so in such a way as to be able to decrypt it prior to
> >> presentation to the vfs layer, where it will be used in an access
> >> check. When the process running with a Smack label "B" comes along
> >> the vfs code will check the fetched and possibly decrypted "A"
> >> against "B" and, unless there is an explicit Smack rule in place
> >> granting "B" access to "A", fail.
> >>
> >> What is the problem? What is eCryptfs doing that prevents this
> >> from working?
> > Hi Casey - I think what Roberto is getting at is the way eCryptfs uses
> > only one lower file per eCryptfs inode. Imagine that there are 5
> > files open for ~/secret/foo at the eCryptfs layer, only 1 file is going
> > to be open in the lower filesystem and all eCryptfs file operations will
> > be multiplexed through it.
> >
> > To make things more complicated, if the eCryptfs file is opened for
> > writing, the lower file must be opened for reading and writing. This is
> > because a write operation requires eCryptfs to vfs_read() from the lower
> > filesystem, decrypt that data and then vfs_write() the new data.
> >
> > If the lower file can't be opened O_RDWR by the calling process, the
> > request is handed off to a kernel thread to open the lower file on
> > behalf of the calling process. It is definitely ugly.
> 
> Is eCryptfs handling xattrs? It needs to be if it isn't.

Yes - we pass the calls to the lower filesystem and return the result.

The only catch would be that users can opt to have eCryptfs store the
crypto metadata in user.ecryptfs instead of the first 8k of the file.

Tyler

> 
> > Roberto, I hope I correctly described the situation that you're trying
> > to address. Can you tell me why we can't have a 1:1 mapping of eCryptfs
> > files to lower files?
> >
> > Instead of having just one lower file attached to the eCryptfs inode, we
> > could have a list of opened files. There would be one for each eCryptfs
> > file that was opened. ecryptfs_writepage() would have to pick, in a
> > somewhat random fashion, one of the lower files to use. Of course, we
> > would still need to solve the problem of opening the lower file O_RDWR
> > when the calling process is only allowed write access (I may have just
> > answered my own question of why the 1:1 mapping technique won't solve
> > this problem).
> >
> > Tyler
> >
> >
> 
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