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Message-ID: <BANLkTik7wQc05OQTHThBbrFhKx2pM1Tx+A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 May 2011 23:07:06 +0200
From: Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Subject: Re: [BUG] perf: bogus correlation of kernel symbols
On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 10:31 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 7:48 AM, Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > I think there is a serious problem with kernel symbol correlation
> > with the latest perf in 2.6.39-rc7-tip.
>
> Yeah. It's annoying. It's a "perf" bug, though - triggered by
> /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict being set to 1.
>
I did not know about this new masquerading of pointers in /proc/kallsyms.
That certainly explains the problem.
>
> The bug is that perf doesn't say "I can't match kernel symbols", but
> instead does some crazy matching and gives total crap module
> information (I think it just picks the one that shows up last in
> /proc/kallsyms).
>
But I agree perf must not silently return bogus information. It
should print a big warning message and/or fallback to printing the raw
addresses. So much for having perf in the kernel source tree to
keep things in sync...
>
> That said, I have considered just reverting the thing that makes
> kptr_restrict be 1 by default. I do like the security implications of
> restricting visibility into kernel pointers, but I also think that
> security rules that make the system less usable are dubious. So I
> dunno.
>
I am not clear as to what people could actually do with the addresses
taken out of /proc/kallsyms. Looks to me like we've lost functionality
for the vast majority of users. So maybe the default should be inverted.
I know of a somewhat similar issue with the file descriptor limit which
people are hitting frequently these days when monitoring apps with lots
of threads or lots of events in one run on large smp systems.
That can easily be corrected by again requires root privilege to regain
the functionality.
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