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Message-ID: <BANLkTimO-8QNumkjzYia5P-V3pm_4JMLxg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 May 2011 23:56:35 +0200
From: Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [BUG] perf: bogus correlation of kernel symbols
On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 11:50 PM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
>
> * Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 11:35 PM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
>> >
>> > * Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >> The other contradiction, I see, is that you have perf_event paranoia level
>> >> and this new kptr masquerading feature which conflict with each
>> >> other.
>> >>
>> >> You can be allowed to monitor at the kernel level (paranoid=1, default)
>> >> but you cannot correlate symbols:
>> >>
>> >> $ perf record -e cycles:k foo
>> >>
>> >> I suspect if you have this kptr thing turned on, then you need to disallow
>> >> monitoring at the kernel level too.
>> >
>> > The better (and consistent) solution would be to turn the kptr_restrict thing
>> > off - see the patch i sent.
>>
>> I saw that. But I think that when someone turns it back on, then you need to
>> increase the perf_events paranoia level to disallow kernel monitoring to
>> regular users such that you maintain consistency across the board.
>
> Dunno, i would not couple them necessarily - certain users might still have
> access to kernel symbols via some other channel - for example the System.map.
>
Ok, that's true, but then you'd need to have perf print a message or refuse to
use /proc/kallsyms and suggest that the user provides a System.map.
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