[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20110520184254.GB18322@elte.hu>
Date: Fri, 20 May 2011 20:42:54 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, davej@...hat.com,
davem@...emloft.net, eranian@...gle.com, adobriyan@...il.com,
penberg@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [BUG] perf: bogus correlation of kernel symbols
* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com> wrote:
> At least one distro (Red Hat) ships with panic_on_oops enabled by default, so
> attackers don't get more than one chance. Likewise, vulnerabilities in
> interrupt context will only have one chance, as will any issue where failed
> exploitation prevents subsequent attempts, as is frequently the case due to
> failures to clean up locking primitives on an OOPS.
So it's basically a last line of defense: the attacker has to assume the risk
of the attack being detected.
That has a chilling effect on some types of attacks: especially those where the
attacker goes against a high value target with a zero day kernel exploit.
Risking a crash does not just mean possibly alerting the target, but also means
possibly losing the zero-day exploit - if that oops log gets to a kernel
developer who starts wondering about the weird backtrace.
Thanks,
Ingo
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists