linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot

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Message-ID: <1306277758.1921.0.camel@dan>
Date:	Tue, 24 May 2011 18:55:58 -0400
From:	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
To:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc:	Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	davej@...hat.com, kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net,
	eranian@...gle.com, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
	adobriyan@...il.com, penberg@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, pageexec@...email.hu
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot

On Tue, 2011-05-24 at 23:02 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> * Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com> wrote:
> 
> > This introduces CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, which randomizes the address at
> > which the kernel is decompressed at boot as a security feature that
> > deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location of kernel
> > internals.  The default values of the kptr_restrict and dmesg_restrict
> > sysctls are set to (1) when this is enabled, since hiding kernel
> > pointers is necessary to preserve the secrecy of the randomized base
> > address.
> 
> That was quick! :-)
> 
> > This feature also uses a fixed mapping to move the IDT (if not already
> > done as a fix for the F00F bug), to avoid exposing the location of
> > kernel internals relative to the original IDT.  This has the additional
> > security benefit of marking the new virtual address of the IDT
> > read-only.
> 
> Btw., as i suggested before the IDT should be made percpu, that way we could 
> split out and evaluate the IDT change independently of any security 
> considerations, as a potential scalability improvement. Makes the decision 
> easier because right now moving the IDT to a 4K TLB increases the kernel's TLB 
> footprint a tiny bit.
> 

Alright, I'll start working on this.

> > Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is supported. If not, 
> > then RDTSC is used, if supported. If neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are supported, 
> > then no randomness is introduced. Support for the CPUID instruction is 
> > required to check for the availability of these two instructions.
> 
> Btw., i'd suggest to fall back not to zero but to something system specific 
> like RAM size or a BIOS signature such as the contents of 0xf0000 or so. This, 
> while clearly not random, will at least *somewhat* randomize the kernel against 
> remote attackers who do not know the RAM size or the system type.
> 

Good idea, will do.

-Dan

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