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Message-ID: <BANLkTi=22rgFJ-7edOf41e013uDnYuVAAg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 26 May 2011 11:35:11 +0300
From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>,
gnatapov@...hat.com, Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>,
Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering
Hi Ingo,
On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 11:24 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
> Unlike Qemu tools/kvm/ has a design that is very fit for MAC
> concepts: it uses separate helper threads for separate resources
> (this could in many cases even be changed to be separate processes
> which only share access to the guest RAM image) - while Qemu is in
> most parts a state machine, so in tools/kvm/ we can realistically
> have a good object manager and keep an exploit in a networking
> interface driver from being able to access disk driver state.
I haven't really followed this particular discussion nor do I know if
Qemu is good or bad fit but sure, for tools/kvm Chrome-style
sandboxing makes tons of sense and would be a pretty good fit for how
our device model works now.
Pekka
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