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Message-ID: <20110526184723.GA3177@elte.hu>
Date: Thu, 26 May 2011 20:47:23 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, Colin Walters <walters@...bum.org>,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call
filtering
* Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> It also gets rid of all configuration - one of the things that
> makes most security frameworks (look at selinux, but also just
> ACL's etc) such a crazy rats nest is the whole "set up for other
> processes". If it's designed very much to be about just the "self"
> process (after initialization etc), then I think that avoids pretty
> much all the serious issues.
That's how the event filters work currently: even when inherited they
get removed when exec-ing a setuid task, so they cannot leak into
privileged context and cannot modify execution there.
Inheritance works when requested, covering only same-credential child
tasks, not privileged successors.
Thanks,
Ingo
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