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Message-ID: <20110527171611.GE4356@elte.hu>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2011 19:16:11 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, davej@...hat.com,
kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net, eranian@...gle.com,
adobriyan@...il.com, penberg@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, pageexec@...email.hu
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot
* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com> wrote:
> Just to play devil's advocate, how is it easier for a local
> attacker to figure out where kernel internals are if it's been
> relinked vs. randomized at load time, assuming we follow through on
> fixing the info leaks?
Well, 'fixing the info leaks' will obfuscate previously useful files
such as /proc/kallsyms ...
That's one of the advantages of randomization: it allows us to expose
RIPs without them being an instant information leak.
Thanks,
Ingo
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