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Message-ID: <BANLkTim7+gPdvQS99oJ7xteYOAQaSSr8Sw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2011 10:21:03 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, davej@...hat.com,
kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net, eranian@...gle.com,
adobriyan@...il.com, penberg@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, pageexec@...email.hu
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot
On Fri, May 27, 2011 at 10:16 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
>
> Well, 'fixing the info leaks' will obfuscate previously useful files
> such as /proc/kallsyms ...
Guys, stop with the crazy already.
YOU HAVE TO DO THAT FOR THE LINK-TIME-OBFUSCATION TOO!
> That's one of the advantages of randomization: it allows us to expose
> RIPs without them being an instant information leak.
Except you clearly aren't thinking that through AT ALL.
The obfuscation of things like /proc/kallsyms is *exactly*the*same*
whether you do the randomization at boot-time or install-time.
For chrissake - you're doing the same thing. The only question is
"when" (and the fact that if you do it at install-time, you can do a
fancier job of it)
Stop wasting peoples time with idiocies, please.
Linus
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