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Message-ID: <4DE046D9.7050700@zytor.com>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2011 17:50:33 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Olivier Galibert <galibert@...ox.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, davej@...hat.com,
kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net, eranian@...gle.com,
adobriyan@...il.com, penberg@...nel.org,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, pageexec@...email.hu
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot
On 05/27/2011 02:51 PM, Olivier Galibert wrote:
> On Fri, May 27, 2011 at 08:17:24PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>> - A root exploit will still not give away the location of the
>> kernel (assuming module loading has been disabled after bootup),
>> so a rootkit cannot be installed 'silently' on the system, into
>> RAM only, evading most offline-storage-checking tools.
>>
>> With static linking this is not possible: reading the kernel image
>> as root trivially exposes the kernel's location.
>
> There's something I don't get there. If you managed to escalate your
> priviledges enough that you have physical ram access, there's a
> billion things you can do to find the kernel, including vector
> tracing, pattern matching, looking at the page tables, etc.
>
> What am I missing?
>
Just makes it harder to automate an attack, and more likely that it will
fail. It's an arms race, of course.
-hpa
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