Date:	Thu,  2 Jun 2011 08:23:23 -0400
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	David Safford <safford@...son.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.s.kasatkin@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 00/20] EVM

Discretionary Access Control(DAC) and Mandatory Access Control(MAC) can
protect the integrity of a running system from unauthorized changes. When
these protections are not running, such as when booting a malicious OS,
mounting the disk under a different operating system, or physically moving
the disk to another system, an "offline" attack is free to read and write
file data/metadata.

Extended Verification Module(EVM) detects offline tampering of the security
extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima),
which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with the IMA-appraisal
patchset, integrity appraisal decisions. This patchset provides the framework
and an initial method to detect offline tampering of the security extended
attributes.  The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of
security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute
'security.evm'. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports
evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates the HMAC and compares it with the
version stored in 'security.evm'.  Other methods of validating the integrity
of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).

Although an offline attack can bypass DAC/MAC protection mechanisms and write
file data/metadata, if the disk, or VM, is subsequently remounted under the
EVM + DAC/MAC (+ IMA-appraisal) protected OS, then the TPM-calculated HMAC of
the file's metadata won't be valid.  Therefore, IMA + MAC/DAC + EVM
(+ IMA-appraisal) can protect system integrity online, detect offline tampering,
and prevent tampered files from being accessed.

While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and
cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other
directory and inode metadata for more complete protection.  To help simplify
the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately
(eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory).  For a general overview of the
proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.

Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for
reviewing the original patches.

Changes from v5:
- defined 'struct evm_ima_xattr_data',
  removed MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size definitions
- check for key failures and errors earlier
- other minor changes enumerated in individual patch descriptions

Changes from v4:
- Added evm_inode_post_init calls for: btrfs, gfs2, jffs2, jfs, and xfs.
- Prevent an invalid security.evm xattr from being updated.
- evm_verifyxattr() performance improvement (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- Fixed evm_verify_hmac() to be fail safe (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- Additional naming change generalizations in preparation for other methods
  of integrity authentication. (Dmitry Kasatkin)

Mimi Zohar
David Safford

Dmitry Kasatkin (5):
  evm: add support for different security.evm data types
  evm: crypto hash replaced by shash
  evm: additional parameter to pass integrity cache entry 'iint'
  evm: evm_verify_hmac must not return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN
  evm: replace hmac_status with evm_status

Mimi Zohar (15):
  integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
  xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
  evm: re-release
  security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
  evm: evm_inode_post_removexattr
  evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
  evm: evm_inode_post_init
  fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
  evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in btrfs
  evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in gfs2
  evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in jffs2
  evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in jfs
  evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in xfs
  evm: permit only valid security.evm xattrs to be updated
  evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid
    security.evm

 Documentation/ABI/testing/evm       |   23 ++
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |    6 +
 fs/attr.c                           |    5 +-
 fs/btrfs/xattr.c                    |   39 +++-
 fs/ext2/xattr_security.c            |   31 +++-
 fs/ext3/xattr_security.c            |   30 ++-
 fs/ext4/xattr_security.c            |   30 ++-
 fs/gfs2/inode.c                     |   29 ++-
 fs/jffs2/security.c                 |   26 ++-
 fs/jfs/xattr.c                      |   45 +++--
 fs/xattr.c                          |   63 ++++++-
 fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c         |   27 ++-
 include/linux/evm.h                 |   92 +++++++++
 include/linux/ima.h                 |   13 --
 include/linux/integrity.h           |   38 ++++
 include/linux/xattr.h               |   14 ++-
 security/Kconfig                    |    2 +-
 security/Makefile                   |    4 +-
 security/integrity/Kconfig          |    7 +
 security/integrity/Makefile         |   12 +
 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig      |   12 +
 security/integrity/evm/Makefile     |    6 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h        |   38 ++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  216 ++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  384 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c  |  108 ++++++++++
 security/integrity/iint.c           |  171 ++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig      |    1 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile     |    2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |   29 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    |    7 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c   |  169 ---------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   |   12 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h      |   47 +++++
 security/security.c                 |   26 ++-
 35 files changed, 1473 insertions(+), 291 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
 create mode 100644 include/linux/evm.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/integrity.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/iint.c
 delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity.h

-- 
1.7.3.4

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