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Message-ID: <BANLkTink868yzHYHd-FyK9BH6nybdSUCuA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2011 18:16:42 -0400
From: Colin Walters <walters@...bum.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kees.cook@...onical.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...e.hu,
rostedt@...dmis.org, jmorris@...ei.org, paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 03/13] seccomp_filters: new mode with configurable
syscall filters
On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 4:34 PM, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote:
> (Any thoughts specifically on the mutex use would be greatly appreciated!)
>
> This change adds a new seccomp mode which specifies the allowed system
> calls dynamically.
One thing to consider (not sure if it's been discussed, but I think
not) is whether some of the LSMs should hook this.
Notably, it looks like SELinux doesn't have an access vector for prctl
at all now; it doesn't hook task_prctl from what I see, and so we fall
back to cap_task_prctl. While I know the idea of restricting a
process' ability to enter seccomp is a bit perverse, we should
probably at least allow mandatory controls. James?
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