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Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2011 14:47:43 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: pageexec@...email.hu
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@....edu>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@...ell.com>,
richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>,
Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@...uu.se>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Louis Rilling <Louis.Rilling@...labs.com>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86-64, vsyscalls: Rename UNSAFE_VSYSCALLS to
COMPAT_VSYSCALLS
* pageexec@...email.hu <pageexec@...email.hu> wrote:
> On 6 Jun 2011 at 12:24, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> >
> > * Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > > On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 2:50 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@....edu> wrote:
> > > > CONFIG_UNSAFE_VSYSCALLS was added in the previous patch as a
> > > > temporary hack to avoid penalizing users who don't build glibc from
> > > > git.
> > >
> > > I really hate that name.
> > >
> > > Do you have *any* reason to call this "unsafe"?
> >
> > No, there's no reason at all for that. That naming is borderline
> > security FUD and last time i saw the series i considered renaming
> > it but got distracted :-)
>
> security FUD? for real? ;) [...]
'Borderline' security FUD! :-)
> [...] does that mean that you guys would accept a patch that would
> map the vdso at a fixed address for old times's sake? if not, on
> what grounds would you refuse it? see, you can't have it both ways.
You can actually do that by enabling CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO=y.
> the fixed address of the vsyscall page *is* a very real security
> problem, it should have never been accepted as such and it's high
> time it went away finally in 2011AD.
It's only a security problem if there's a security hole elsewhere.
The thing is, and i'm not sure whether you realize or recognize it,
but these measures *are* two-edged swords.
Yes, the upside is that they reduce the risks associated with
security holes - but only statistically so.
The downside is that having such a measure in place makes it somewhat
less likely that those bugs will be found and fixed in the future: if
a bug is not exploitable then people like Spender wont spend time
exploiting and making a big deal out of them, right?
And yes, it might be embarrasing to see easy exploits and we might
roll eyes at the associated self-promotion circus but it will be one
more bug found, the reasons for the bug will be examined, potentially
avoiding a whole class of similar bugs *for sure*.
Can you guarantee that security bugs will be found and fixed with the
same kind of intensity even if we make their exploitation (much)
harder? I don't think you can make such a guarantee.
So as long as we are trading bugs-fixed-for-sure against statistical
safety we have to be mindful of the downsides of such a tradeoff ...
Thanks,
Ingo
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