| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <1308146299-13015-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2011 17:58:19 +0400 From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...e.de>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>, Nikanth Karthikesan <knikanth@...e.de>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org Subject: [RFC 5/5 v3] procfs: add documentation for procfs mount options Add documentation for procfs mount options. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> --- Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt index f481780..327a640 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ Table of Contents 3.5 /proc/<pid>/mountinfo - Information about mounts 3.6 /proc/<pid>/comm & /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/comm + 4 Configuring procfs + 4.1 Mount options ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Preface @@ -1541,3 +1543,52 @@ a task to set its own or one of its thread siblings comm value. The comm value is limited in size compared to the cmdline value, so writing anything longer then the kernel's TASK_COMM_LEN (currently 16 chars) will result in a truncated comm value. + + +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +Configuring procfs +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +4.1 Mount options +--------------------- + +The following mount options are supported: + + hidepid= Set /proc/<pid>/ access mode. + hidenet Hide /proc/<pid>/net/ from nonauthorized users. + nohidenet Don't hide /proc/<pid>/net/ from nonauthorized users. + gid= Set the group authorized to learn processes and + networking information. + +hidepid=0 means classic mode - everybody may access all /proc/<pid>/ directories +(default). + +hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but their +own. Sensitive files like cmdline, io, sched*, status, wchan are now protected +against other users. This makes impossible to learn whether any user runs +specific program (given the program doesn't reveal itself by its behaviour). +As an additional bonus, as /proc/<pid>/cmdline is unaccessible for other users, +poorly written programs passing sensitive information via program arguments are +now protected against local eavesdroppers. + +hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/<pid>/ will be fully invisible to other +users. It doesn't mean that it hides a fact whether a process with a specific +pid value exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g. by sending signals), +but it hides process' uid and gid, which may be learned by stat()'ing +/proc/<pid>/ otherwise. It greatly complicates intruder's task of gathering info +about running processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, +whether other user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any +program at all, etc. + +hidenet means /proc/<pid>/net/ will be accessible to processes with +CAP_NET_ADMIN capability or to members of a special group. It means +nonauthorized users may not learn any networking connections information. If +network namespaces support is enabled (CONFIG_NET_NS=y) then common users would +obtain net directory, but all files would indicate no networking activity at +all. If network namespaces are disabled, net directory is unaccessible to +common users. + +gid= means group authorized to learn processes information prohibited by +hidepid= and networking information prohibited by hidenet. If you use some +daemon like identd which have to learn information about net/processes +information, just add identd to this group. -- 1.7.0.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists