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Message-ID: <20110616133359.GA12564@albatros>
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2011 17:33:59 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...e.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount
options
Arnd,
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 13:40 +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> E.g. if all the sensitive information
> you are hiding in procfs is still available through netlink, your patch
> is pointless.
Ah, I've complitely missed this piece of a puzzle! :( With procfs, proc
connector and taskstats (probably, something else) should be restricted
too.
Thank you very much for this notice!
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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