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Message-ID: <20110622101724.GA4278@albatros>
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2011 14:17:24 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...e.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount
options
On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 10:45 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> More generic solution (I'm not suggesting it, but merely discussing)
> would use some user-supplied set of files to restrict access to (or,
> better, the set of allowed files because white list is almost always
> better than black list). Maybe this one:
>
> mount -t proc -o "pid_allow=exe,status,comm,oom_*" proc /proc
>
> And without pid_allow it would behave like pid_allow=*.
> "pid_allow=."
> would deny access to the whole /proc/PID.
I mean "pid_allow=", of course.
> This would be a bit inconsistent with current permissions because e.g.
> if use pid_allow=environ then environ file would not be accessible
> because of posix permissions. Hierarchical mode (pid_allow=fd/1) is not
> allowed too.
For hierarchical mode: attr_allowed, tgid_allowed, tid_allowed.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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