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Message-Id: <1310513452-13397-4-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 23:30:41 +0000
From: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 03/14] keyctl: check capabilities against key's user_ns
From: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
ATM, task should only be able to get his own user_ns's keys
anyway, so nsown_capable should also work, but there is no
advantage to doing that, while using key's user_ns is clearer.
changelog: jun 6:
compile fix: keyctl.c (key_user, not key has user_ns)
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
---
security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 +++--
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index eca5191..fa7d420 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid)
goto error_put;
@@ -852,7 +852,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
down_write(&key->sem);
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
+ if (ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+ key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
key->perm = perm;
ret = 0;
}
--
1.7.4.1
--
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