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Message-ID: <20110715105557.7cb3dfcc@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 10:55:57 +0100
From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Mike Waychison <mikew@...gle.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...e.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86: Allow disabling of sys_iopl, sys_ioperm
> > So lets turn the question around a moment - what breaks if you simply
> > take CAP_SYS_RAWIO away from everything ?
> >
>
> Alright, I see your point. ISTR that CAP_SYS_RAWIO was required for
> accessing block devices directly, but this doesn't seem to be the
> case.
Its needed for certain kinds of command issue (raw commands) but not I
believe raw block I/O
> I think the approach I'll try next is to try and drop it with
> PR_CAPBSET_DROP from early userspace's init.
>
> Any other vectors you would suggest to keep the kiddies away?
/dev/mem /dev/kmem (which do have options to clamp down on)
module loading you have down
GPU if you don't need any graphics. Not so much because its a specific
threat area but because its a large exposure.
For media there are exploit paths to consider where an attacker rewrites
the boot media and reboots. If you need raw disk I/O those are a spot
harder to mend.
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