linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/1] Fixup write permission of TLB on powerpc e500 core

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Message-ID: <4E230270.20209@gmail.com>
Date:	Sun, 17 Jul 2011 23:40:32 +0800
From:	Shan Hai <haishan.bai@...il.com>
To:	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>
CC:	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, paulus@...ba.org,
	tglx@...utronix.de, walken@...gle.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
	cmetcalf@...era.com, tony.luck@...el.com,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Fixup write permission of TLB on powerpc e500 core

On 07/17/2011 10:48 PM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote:
> On Sun, 2011-07-17 at 21:33 +0800, Shan Hai wrote:
>> On ARM you could not protect pages from supervisor-mode writes,
>> isn't it?  That means, all writable user pages are writable for
>> supervisor too, but its not hold for at least x86 and powerpc,
>> x86 and powerpc can be configured to protect pages from
>> supervisor-mode writes.
> That doesn't sound right... how would put_user() work properly then ? A
> cursory glance at the ARM code doesn't show it doing anything "special",
> just stores ... but I might have missing something.
>

That's real for ARM, for the reason put_user() work properly is that
the first time access to the write protected page triggers a page
fault, and the handle_mm_fault() will fix up the write permission
for the kernel, because at this time no one disabled the page fault
as done in the futex case.

>> Think about the following situation,
>> a page fault occurs on the kernel trying to write to a writable shared
>> user page which is read only to the kernel, the following conditions
>> hold,
>> - the page is *present*, because its a shared page
>> - the page is *writable*, because demand paging sets up the pte for
>>       the current process to so
>>
>> The follow_page() called in the __get_user_page() returns non NULL
>> to its caller on the above mentioned *present* and *writable* page,
>> so the gup(.write=1) has no chance to set pte dirty by calling
>> handle_mm_fault,
>> the follow_page() has no knowledge of supervisor-mode write protected
>> pages,
>> that's the culprit in the bug discussed here.
> Right, the problem is with writable pages that have "lost" (or never had
> but usually it's lost, due to swapping for example) their dirty bit, or
> any page that has lost young.
>
>  From what I can tell, we need to either fix those bits from the caller
> of gup (futex code), which sound nasty, or more easily fix those from
> gup itself, possibly under control of flags in the "write" argument to
> avoid breaking code relying on the existing behaviour, expecially vs.
> dirty.
>

So, for the reason the SW tracked dirty/young and supervisor protected
pages has potential effects on not only *futex* but also on other components
of the kernel which might access the non-dirty supervisor protected page,
in my opinion it might be more sensible to fix it from gup instead of fixing
it in the futex.

Thanks
Shan Hai

> Cheers,
> Ben.
>
>

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