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Message-Id: <1313590996-8019-1-git-send-email-stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2011 16:23:16 +0200
From: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@...onical.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...nel.org,
kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Subject: [2.6.32+drm33-longterm] Linux 2.6.32.45+drm33.19
I am announcing the release of the 2.6.32.45+drm33.19 longterm tree.
This tree is based on 2.6.32 and generally has all of the stable updates
applied. Except those to the DRM subsystem, which was based on 2.6.33 and
took updates from that upstream stable as long as that existed. It will
continue to add patches to the DRM subsystem as long as they are valid
according to the stable update rules (Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt).
DRM patches for this tree should be sent to kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com.
This release contains patches from upstream 2.6.32.45, but dropped any patches
to the DRM subsystem.
The updated 2.6.32.y-drm33.z tree can be found at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/smb/linux-2.6.32.y-drm33.z.git
and can be browsed through git web via:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/smb/linux-2.6.32.y-drm33.z.git;a=summary
-Stefan
------
* crypto: Move md5_transform to lib/md5.c
* net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
* ALSA: timer - Fix Oops at closing slave timer
* ALSA: snd-usb-caiaq: Fix keymap for RigKontrol3
* powerpc: Fix device tree claim code
* powerpc: pseries: Fix kexec on machines with more than 4TB of RAM
* Linux 2.6.32.45
Makefile | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c | 6 +-
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c | 2 +-
crypto/md5.c | 92 +--------
drivers/char/random.c | 334 +-----------------------------
include/linux/cryptohash.h | 5 +
include/linux/random.h | 11 -
include/net/secure_seq.h | 20 ++
lib/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/md5.c | 95 +++++++++
net/core/Makefile | 2 +-
net/core/secure_seq.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++
net/dccp/ipv4.c | 1 +
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 9 +-
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 1 +
net/ipv4/inetpeer.c | 1 +
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c | 1 +
net/ipv4/route.c | 1 +
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 1 +
net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 1 +
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 1 +
sound/core/timer.c | 2 +
sound/usb/caiaq/input.c | 2 +-
23 files changed, 333 insertions(+), 443 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 001e79b..182249a 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
VERSION = 2
PATCHLEVEL = 6
SUBLEVEL = 32
-EXTRAVERSION = .44+drm33.19
+EXTRAVERSION = .45+drm33.19
NAME = Man-Eating Seals of Antiquity
# *DOCUMENTATION*
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
index bafac2e..2edcfed 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ static unsigned long __init alloc_up(unsigned long size, unsigned long align)
}
if (addr == 0)
return 0;
- RELOC(alloc_bottom) = addr;
+ RELOC(alloc_bottom) = addr + size;
prom_debug(" -> %x\n", addr);
prom_debug(" alloc_bottom : %x\n", RELOC(alloc_bottom));
@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ static void __init *make_room(unsigned long *mem_start, unsigned long *mem_end,
chunk = alloc_up(room, 0);
if (chunk == 0)
prom_panic("No memory for flatten_device_tree (claim failed)");
- *mem_end = RELOC(alloc_top);
+ *mem_end = chunk + room;
}
ret = (void *)*mem_start;
@@ -1923,7 +1923,7 @@ static void __init flatten_device_tree(void)
mem_start = (unsigned long)alloc_up(room, PAGE_SIZE);
if (mem_start == 0)
prom_panic("Can't allocate initial device-tree chunk\n");
- mem_end = RELOC(alloc_top);
+ mem_end = mem_start + room;
/* Get root of tree */
root = call_prom("peer", 1, 1, (phandle)0);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c
index 5f2c511..d5db4c6 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void pSeries_lpar_hptab_clear(void)
unsigned long ptel;
} ptes[4];
long lpar_rc;
- int i, j;
+ unsigned long i, j;
/* Read in batches of 4,
* invalidate only valid entries not in the VRMA
diff --git a/crypto/md5.c b/crypto/md5.c
index 83eb529..156b6bc 100644
--- a/crypto/md5.c
+++ b/crypto/md5.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16
@@ -27,103 +28,12 @@
#define MD5_BLOCK_WORDS 16
#define MD5_HASH_WORDS 4
-#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
-#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
-#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
-#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
-
-#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
- (w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
-
struct md5_ctx {
u32 hash[MD5_HASH_WORDS];
u32 block[MD5_BLOCK_WORDS];
u64 byte_count;
};
-static void md5_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
-{
- u32 a, b, c, d;
-
- a = hash[0];
- b = hash[1];
- c = hash[2];
- d = hash[3];
-
- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
-
- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
-
- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
-
- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
-
- hash[0] += a;
- hash[1] += b;
- hash[2] += c;
- hash[3] += d;
-}
-
/* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
{
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 908ac1f..3a19e2d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1339,330 +1339,14 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
};
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-/********************************************************************
- *
- * Random funtions for networking
- *
- ********************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
- * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
- * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
- * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints. This defeats
- * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
- * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
- *
- * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
- * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
- * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
- */
-
-/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
-#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
-#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
-#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
-
-/*
- * The generic round function. The application is so specific that
- * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
- * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
- * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
- */
-#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
- (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
-#define K1 0
-#define K2 013240474631UL
-#define K3 015666365641UL
+static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-
-static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
+static int __init random_int_secret_init(void)
{
- __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
-
- /* Round 1 */
- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1, 7);
- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1, 3);
- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1, 7);
- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1, 3);
- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1, 7);
- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
-
- /* Round 2 */
- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2, 3);
- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2, 5);
- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2, 9);
- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2, 3);
- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2, 5);
- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2, 9);
- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2, 3);
- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2, 5);
- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2, 9);
- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
-
- /* Round 3 */
- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3, 3);
- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3, 9);
- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3, 3);
- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3, 9);
- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3, 3);
- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3, 9);
- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
-
- return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
- /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
-}
-#endif
-
-#undef ROUND
-#undef F
-#undef G
-#undef H
-#undef K1
-#undef K2
-#undef K3
-
-/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
-#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
-/*
- * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
- * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
- * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
- *
- * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
- * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
- * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
- * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
- * to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
- * clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
- *
- * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
- * 4.55 hours.
- *
- * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
- * Manfred Spraul <manfred@...orfullife.com>
- *
- */
-#define COUNT_BITS 8
-#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
-#define HASH_BITS 24
-#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
-
-static struct keydata {
- __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
- __u32 secret[12];
-} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
-
-static unsigned int ip_cnt;
-
-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work);
-
-static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator);
-
-/*
- * Lock avoidance:
- * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
- * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
- * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
- * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
- * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
- * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
- * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
- * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
- * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
- */
-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
-
- get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
- keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
- smp_wmb();
- ip_cnt++;
- schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work,
- round_jiffies_relative(REKEY_INTERVAL));
-}
-
-static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
-
- smp_rmb();
-
- return keyptr;
-}
-
-static __init int seqgen_init(void)
-{
- rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
+ get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret));
return 0;
}
-late_initcall(seqgen_init);
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
-{
- __u32 seq;
- __u32 hash[12];
- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
- /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
- * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
- */
-
- memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
- hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
- memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
-
- seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
- seq += keyptr->count;
-
- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
-
- return seq;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
-#endif
-
-/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
- * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@....ru>.
- */
-__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr;
- __u32 hash[4];
-
- keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
- /*
- * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
- * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
- * which is then hashed with random data.
- */
- hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
- hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
- hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
- return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
-
-__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
-{
- __u32 seq;
- __u32 hash[4];
- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
- /*
- * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
- * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
- * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
- * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
- */
- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
- hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
- seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
- seq += keyptr->count;
- /*
- * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
- * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
- * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
- * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
- * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
- * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
- * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
- * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
- */
- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
-
- return seq;
-}
-
-/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
- u32 hash[4];
-
- /*
- * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
- * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
- */
- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
- hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
- return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
- __be16 dport)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
- u32 hash[12];
-
- memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
- hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
- memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
-
- return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
-/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
- * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
- * 0-31 hash(source, dest)
- */
-u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
-{
- u64 seq;
- __u32 hash[4];
- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
- hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
- seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
- seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
-
- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
- seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
-
- return seq;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
-#endif
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
-
+late_initcall(random_int_secret_init);
/*
* Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
@@ -1670,17 +1354,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
* value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
* depleting entropy is too high
*/
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [4], get_random_int_hash);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
unsigned int get_random_int(void)
{
- struct keydata *keyptr;
__u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
- int ret;
+ unsigned int ret;
- keyptr = get_keyptr();
hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles();
-
- ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+ md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
+ ret = hash[0];
put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/cryptohash.h b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
index c118b2ad..1ba279b 100644
--- a/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+++ b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@
void sha_init(__u32 *buf);
void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *W);
+#define MD5_DIGEST_WORDS 4
+#define MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES 64
+
+void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in);
+
__u32 half_md4_transform(__u32 buf[4], __u32 const in[8]);
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 25d02fe..2948046 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -53,17 +53,6 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
-extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
-extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
-extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
- __be16 dport);
-extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
-extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
-extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
-
#ifndef MODULE
extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
#endif
diff --git a/include/net/secure_seq.h b/include/net/secure_seq.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d97f689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#ifndef _NET_SECURE_SEQ
+#define _NET_SECURE_SEQ
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
+extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]);
+extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 dport);
+extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+extern u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+
+#endif /* _NET_SECURE_SEQ */
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 9b82771..11ed6a1 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ endif
lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o \
idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o prio_tree.o \
- sha1.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
+ sha1.o md5.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
proportions.o prio_heap.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o flex_array.o
diff --git a/lib/md5.c b/lib/md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c777180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+
+#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
+#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
+#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
+
+#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
+ (w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
+
+void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in)
+{
+ u32 a, b, c, d;
+
+ a = hash[0];
+ b = hash[1];
+ c = hash[2];
+ d = hash[3];
+
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
+
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
+
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
+
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
+
+ hash[0] += a;
+ hash[1] += b;
+ hash[2] += c;
+ hash[3] += d;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(md5_transform);
diff --git a/net/core/Makefile b/net/core/Makefile
index 796f46e..ace37e4 100644
--- a/net/core/Makefile
+++ b/net/core/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#
obj-y := sock.o request_sock.o skbuff.o iovec.o datagram.o stream.o scm.o \
- gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o
+ gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o secure_seq.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_core.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_DMA) += skb_dma_map.o
diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45329d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/ktime.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+static u32 net_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+static int __init net_secret_init(void)
+{
+ get_random_bytes(net_secret, sizeof(net_secret));
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(net_secret_init);
+
+static u32 seq_scale(u32 seq)
+{
+ /*
+ * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
+ * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
+ * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
+ * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
+ * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
+ * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
+ * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
+ * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
+ */
+ return seq + (ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+ u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
+ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+ u32 i;
+
+ memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
+ secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
+ (((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
+ for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
+ secret[i] = net_secret[i];
+
+ md5_transform(hash, secret);
+
+ return seq_scale(hash[0]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
+
+u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 dport)
+{
+ u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
+ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+ u32 i;
+
+ memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ secret[i] = net_secret[i] + (__force u32) daddr[i];
+ secret[4] = net_secret[4] + (__force u32)dport;
+ for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
+ secret[i] = net_secret[i];
+
+ md5_transform(hash, secret);
+
+ return hash[0];
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INET
+__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
+{
+ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+
+ hash[0] = (__force __u32) daddr;
+ hash[1] = net_secret[13];
+ hash[2] = net_secret[14];
+ hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+
+ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+ return hash[0];
+}
+
+__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
+{
+ __u32 hash[4];
+
+ memcpy(hash, daddr, 16);
+ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+ return hash[0];
+}
+
+__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+
+ hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+ hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+ hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+ hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+
+ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+ return seq_scale(hash[0]);
+}
+
+u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+{
+ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+
+ hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+ hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+ hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ net_secret[14];
+ hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+
+ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+ return hash[0];
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
+u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+ u64 seq;
+
+ hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+ hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+ hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+ hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+
+ md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+ seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
+ seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+ seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
+
+ return seq;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+ u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
+ u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+ u64 seq;
+ u32 i;
+
+ memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
+ secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
+ (((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
+ for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
+ secret[i] = net_secret[i];
+
+ md5_transform(hash, secret);
+
+ seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
+ seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+ seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
+
+ return seq;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccpv6_sequence_number);
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv4.c b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
index 7302e14..d14c0a3 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <net/timewait_sock.h>
#include <net/tcp_states.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include "ackvec.h"
#include "ccid.h"
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index e48ca5d..9ed1962 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <net/transp_v6.h>
#include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include "dccp.h"
#include "ipv6.h"
@@ -69,13 +70,7 @@ static inline void dccp_v6_send_check(struct sock *sk, int unused_value,
dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb, &np->saddr, &np->daddr);
}
-static inline __u32 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
- __be16 sport, __be16 dport )
-{
- return secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(saddr, daddr, sport, dport);
-}
-
-static inline __u32 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline __u64 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 625cc5f..d717267 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
#include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
/*
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
index b1fbe18..13b229f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/inetpeer.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
/*
* Theory of operations.
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
index 6c4f11f..2d5073a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_nat.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_rule.h>
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index 6c8f6c9..58f141b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#endif
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#define RT_FL_TOS(oldflp) \
((u32)(oldflp->fl4_tos & (IPTOS_RT_MASK | RTO_ONLINK)))
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 7cda24b..6fc7961 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
#include <net/timewait_sock.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/netdma.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <linux/inet.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
index 1bcc343..093e9b2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
#include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
#include <net/inet6_hashtables.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
void __inet6_hash(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 21d100b..faae6df 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#include <net/timewait_sock.h>
#include <net/netdma.h>
#include <net/inet_common.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 8f8b17a..4a13844 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -530,6 +530,8 @@ int snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri)
if (err < 0)
return err;
timer = timeri->timer;
+ if (!timer)
+ return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
timeri->cticks = timeri->ticks;
timeri->pticks = 0;
diff --git a/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c b/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
index a48d309..c93e1aa 100644
--- a/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
+++ b/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static unsigned short keycode_ak1[] = { KEY_C, KEY_B, KEY_A };
static unsigned short keycode_rk2[] = { KEY_1, KEY_2, KEY_3, KEY_4,
KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7 };
static unsigned short keycode_rk3[] = { KEY_1, KEY_2, KEY_3, KEY_4,
- KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7, KEY_5, KEY_6 };
+ KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7, KEY_8, KEY_9 };
static unsigned short keycode_kore[] = {
KEY_FN_F1, /* "menu" */
--
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