[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <4E566093.8080707@parallels.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 18:47:47 +0400
From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
CC: Zan Lynx <zlynx@....org>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Nathan Lynch <ntl@...ox.com>,
Oren Laadan <orenl@...columbia.edu>,
Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@...ibm.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Glauber Costa <glommer@...allels.com>,
"containers@...ts.osdl.org" <containers@...ts.osdl.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
LINUXFS-ML <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Bottomley <jbottomley@...allels.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] fs, proc: Introduce the /proc/<pid>/map_files/ directory
v2
On 08/25/2011 06:04 PM, Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 10:42:44AM +0400, Pavel Emelyanov wrote:
>> On 08/24/2011 09:36 PM, Andi Kleen wrote:
>>> Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com> writes:
>>>>
>>>> No and this is the trick - when you readlink it - it give you trash, but
>>>> when you open one - you get exactly the same file as the map points to.
>>>
>>> Isn't that a minor security hole?
>>>
>>> For example if I pass a file descriptor into a chroot process for
>>> reading, and with this interface you can open it for writing too.
>>> I could see this causing problems.
>>
>> How does it differ from the /proc/pid/fd links?
>
> Those cannot be opened I thought.
Neither can be these links then - I use the same access checks in my code.
> -Andi
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists