linux-kernel - [PATCH 10/15] net/core/scm.c: target capable() calls to user_ns owning the net

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <1314993400-6910-13-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
Date:	Fri,  2 Sep 2011 19:56:35 +0000
From:	Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
To:	akpm@...l.org, segooon@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
	dhowells@...hat.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com, rdunlap@...otime.net
Cc:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/15] net/core/scm.c: target capable() calls to user_ns owning the net_ns

From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>

The uid/gid comparisons don't have to be pulled out.  This just seemed
more easily proved correct.

Changelog:
   mark struct cred arg const

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
---
 net/core/scm.c |   41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 811b53f..4f376bf 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -43,17 +43,44 @@
  *	setu(g)id.
  */
 
-static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
+static __inline__ bool uidequiv(const struct cred *src, struct ucred *tgt,
+			       struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (src->user_ns != ns)
+		goto check_capable;
+	if (src->uid == tgt->uid || src->euid == tgt->uid ||
+	    src->suid == tgt->uid)
+		return true;
+check_capable:
+	if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static __inline__ bool gidequiv(const struct cred *src, struct ucred *tgt,
+			       struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (src->user_ns != ns)
+		goto check_capable;
+	if (src->gid == tgt->gid || src->egid == tgt->gid ||
+	    src->sgid == tgt->gid)
+		return true;
+check_capable:
+	if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETGID))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds, struct socket *sock)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct user_namespace *ns = sock_net(sock->sk)->user_ns;
 
-	if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
-	    ((creds->uid == cred->uid   || creds->uid == cred->euid ||
-	      creds->uid == cred->suid) || capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
-	    ((creds->gid == cred->gid   || creds->gid == cred->egid ||
-	      creds->gid == cred->sgid) || capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
+	if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
+	     uidequiv(cred, creds, ns) && gidequiv(cred, creds, ns)) {
 	       return 0;
 	}
+
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
@@ -169,7 +196,7 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
 			if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred)))
 				goto error;
 			memcpy(&p->creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
-			err = scm_check_creds(&p->creds);
+			err = scm_check_creds(&p->creds, sock);
 			if (err)
 				goto error;
 
-- 
1.7.5.4

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/