lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Mon, 5 Sep 2011 12:52:42 +0100
From:	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@...citrix.com>
To:	Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>
CC:	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Nick Piggin <npiggin@...nel.dk>, Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>,
	Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>,
	KVM <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
	Xen Devel <xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com>,
	Jeremy Fitzhardinge <Jeremy.Fitzhardinge@...rix.com>,
	Stefano Stabellini <Stefano.Stabellini@...citrix.com>,
	Keir Fraser <keir@....org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/13] xen/pvticketlock: disable interrupts while
 blocking

CC'ing Keir.

On Fri, 2 Sep 2011, Jeremy Fitzhardinge wrote:
> On 09/02/2011 01:47 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Fri, 2011-09-02 at 12:29 -0700, Jeremy Fitzhardinge wrote:
> >>> I know that its generally considered bad form, but there's at least one
> >>> spinlock that's only taken from NMI context and thus hasn't got any
> >>> deadlock potential.
> >> Which one? 
> > arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:nmi_reason_lock
> >
> > It serializes NMI access to the NMI reason port across CPUs.
> 
> Ah, OK.  Well, that will never happen in a PV Xen guest.  But PV
> ticketlocks are equally applicable to an HVM Xen domain (and KVM guest),
> so I guess there's at least some chance there could be a virtual
> emulated NMI.  Maybe?  Does qemu do that kind of thing?

Xen knows how to inject NMIs to HVM guests, even though I am not sure
if it is actually done in practice at the moment.

However digging into the implementation details, it looks like virtual
NMIs are not injected if blocking-by-STI (or blocking-by-MOV-SS), so we
should be fine, even though I don't know if you actually want to rely on
this:

/*
 * We can only inject an NMI if no blocking by MOV SS (also, depending on
 * implementation, if no blocking by STI). If pin-based 'virtual NMIs'
 * control is specified then the NMI-blocking interruptibility flag is
 * also checked. The 'virtual NMI pending' control (available only in
 * conjunction with 'virtual NMIs') causes a VM exit when all these checks
 * succeed. It will exit immediately after VM entry if the checks succeed
 * at that point.
 * 
 * Because a processor may or may not check blocking-by-STI when injecting
 * a virtual NMI, it will be necessary to convert that to block-by-MOV-SS
 * before specifying the 'virtual NMI pending' control. Otherwise we could
 * enter an infinite loop where we check blocking-by-STI in software and
 * thus delay delivery of a virtual NMI, but the processor causes immediate
 * VM exit because it does not check blocking-by-STI.
 */
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists