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Message-ID: <20110918170512.GA2351@albatros>
Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2011 21:05:12 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to
/proc/slabinfo
Hi Andrew,
On Wed, Sep 14, 2011 at 12:27 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 08:41:34PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > Historically /proc/slabinfo has 0444 permissions and is accessible to
> > the world. slabinfo contains rather private information related both to
> > the kernel and userspace tasks. Depending on the situation, it might
> > reveal either private information per se or information useful to make
> > another targeted attack. Some examples of what can be learned by
> > reading/watching for /proc/slabinfo entries:
> > ...
> > World readable slabinfo simplifies kernel developers' job of debugging
> > kernel bugs (e.g. memleaks), but I believe it does more harm than
> > benefits. For most users 0444 slabinfo is an unreasonable attack vector.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
>
> Haven't had any mass complaints about the 0400 in Ubuntu (sorry Dave!), so
> I'm obviously for it.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>
Looks like the members of the previous slabinfo discussion don't object
against the patch now and it got two other Reviewed-by responses. Can
you merge it as-is or should I probably convince someone else?
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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