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Message-ID: <14587.1316462369@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 15:59:29 -0400
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@...two.org>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>,
Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
On Mon, 19 Sep 2011 12:51:10 CDT, Christoph Lameter said:
> IMHO a restriction of access to slab statistics is reasonable in a
> hardened environment. Make it dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY or some such
> thing?
Probably need to invent a separate Kconfig variable - CONFIG_SECURITY
is probably a way-too-big hammer for this nail. I can see lots of systems
that want to enable that, but won't want to tighten access to slab.
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