linux-kernel - Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo

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Date:	Wed, 21 Sep 2011 22:20:54 -0400
From:	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To:	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Cc:	Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...stprotocols.net>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo

On Wed, 21 Sep 2011 21:05:27 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov said:
> Sorry, I've poorly worded my statement.  Of course I mean root-only
> slabinfo, not totally disable it.

Oh, that I can live with.. ;)

> Linus, Alan, Kees, and Dave are about to simply restrict slabinfo (and
> probably similar interfaces) to root.  Pekka is OK too.
> 
> Christoph and Valdis are about to create new CONFIG_ option to be able
> to restrict the access to slabinfo/etc., but with old relaxed
> permissions.

I'm OK with a decision to just make the files mode 400 and be done with it,
since I can always stick a chmod in the startup scripts if it's *really* a problem.

Just that *if* we add a CONFIG_ option, it shouldn't be slabinfo-specific, but
should cover the *other* identified info-leakers in /proc and /sys as well.

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