linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fix PIE execution with randomization disabled

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Message-Id: <20110929141929.43df799d.akpm00@gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 29 Sep 2011 14:19:29 -0700
From:	Andrew Morton <akpm00@...il.com>
To:	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>
Cc:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
	hongjiu.lu@...el.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Nicolas Pitre <nico@...xnic.net>,
	Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Russell King <rmk@....linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fix PIE execution with randomization
 disabled

On Thu, 29 Sep 2011 15:53:59 -0400
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com> wrote:

> We've had a bug report[1] of some PIE programs getting a SIGKILL upon exec
> if you disable address randomization with:
> 
> 	echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
> 
> I tracked this down to get_unmapped_area_prot returning -ENOMEM because
> the address being passed in is larger than TASK_SIZE - len for the bss
> section of the test executable.  That filters back to set_brk returning
> an error to load_elf_binary and the SIGKILL being sent around line 872
> of binfmt_elf.c.
> 
> H.J. submitted an upstream bug report [2] as well, but got no feedback
> and we can't view it with kernel.org being down anyway.  He came up with
> the patch below as well, which is what I'm sending on for comments.  The
> changelog is my addition, so if that is wrong yell at me.
> 
> I wanted to get some more eyes on this, because the current code sets
> load_bias to 0 unconditionally on CONFIG_X86 or CONFIG_ARM.  I have no
> idea why that is.  The original execshield patches had an #ifdef on
> __i386__ but the patch that was commited to add PIE support has the
> CONFIG_X86 setting.
> 

It appears that Nicolas understood what's going on in there when he
wrote e4eab08d6050ad0 ("ARM: 6342/1: fix ASLR of PIE executables"). 
Alas, that patch's changelog is rather useless.

Help?

Also, please: review and test?

> 
> [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=708563
> [2] http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36372
> 
> josh
> 
> ---
> 
> From: H.J. Lu <hongjiu.lu@...el.com>
> 
> Set the load_bias for PIE executables to a non-zero address if no virtual
> address is specified.  This prevents us from running out of room for all
> the various loadable segments when ASLR is disabled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hongjiu.lu@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>
> 
> ---
> 
> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> index 303983f..069ee29 100644
> --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> @@ -794,9 +794,14 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
>  			/* Try and get dynamic programs out of the way of the
>  			 * default mmap base, as well as whatever program they
>  			 * might try to exec.  This is because the brk will
> -			 * follow the loader, and is not movable.  */
> +			 * follow the loader, and is not movable.  Don't use
> +			 * 0 load address since we may not have room for
> +			 * all loadable segements.  */
>  #if defined(CONFIG_X86) || defined(CONFIG_ARM)
> -			load_bias = 0;
> +			if (vaddr)
> +				load_bias = 0;
> +			else
> +				load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE);
>  #else
>  			load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
>  #endif
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