linux-kernel - Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

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Date:	Tue, 4 Oct 2011 14:51:34 +0200
From:	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
To:	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

On Mon, Oct 03, 2011 at 01:19:27PM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Fri, 30 Sep 2011, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> 
> > Since the kernel.org status announcement last week a number of you
> > have contacted me about re-establishing credentials.  In order to
> > establish a proper PGP web of trust we need keys that are cross-signed
> > by other developers.  As such, we ask that you follow the following
> > steps:
> > 
> > 1. Make sure your systems are uncompromised.  We will address specific
> >    recommended steps for that in a separate email.
> > 
> > 2. Create a new PGP/GPG key, and also generate a key revocation
> >    certificate (but don't import it anywhere -- save it for the
> >    future) for your new key.  In the near future we are considering
> >    setting up an escrow service for key revocation certificates.
> > 
> >    I recommend using a 4096-bit RSA key.  Given how fast computers are
> >    these days, there is no reason to use a shorter key.  DSA keys
> >    should be considered obsolete; substantial weaknesses have been
> >    found in DSA.
> > 
> >    $ gpg --gen-key
> >    $ gpg -u <key ID> -o <key ID>.revoke --gen-revoke
> > 
> > 3. If you are reasonably certain that your old key has never been
> >    jeopardized, sign the new key with the old key.
> 
> I have a question here. In case people are 'reasonably certain' that the 
> old key has never been jeoparadized, why are they required to create a new 
> key?
> 
> (if the old key would have been compromised, the attacker could as well 
> generate a new key and sign it with the old key himself, so I fail to see 
> any benefit of this PGP excercise).
> 
> It doesn't make too much sense to force people to live with two different 
> personalities in this "PGP web of trust" world just for the sake of 
> kernel.org, does it?

Also same question here. And as far as I can tell nobody has given an
answer yet.
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