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Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1110050000380.31654@pobox.suse.cz>
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2011 00:02:16 +0200 (CEST)
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
To: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust
On Tue, 4 Oct 2011, Heiko Carstens wrote:
> > I have a question here. In case people are 'reasonably certain' that the
> > old key has never been jeoparadized, why are they required to create a new
> > key?
> >
> > (if the old key would have been compromised, the attacker could as well
> > generate a new key and sign it with the old key himself, so I fail to see
> > any benefit of this PGP excercise).
> >
> > It doesn't make too much sense to force people to live with two different
> > personalities in this "PGP web of trust" world just for the sake of
> > kernel.org, does it?
>
> Also same question here. And as far as I can tell nobody has given an
> answer yet.
In the meantime, at least one reason came up in parallel discussion ... a
lot of people have those oldish keys generated as 1024bit or so, and using
DSA.
And it seems like 4096/RSA is sort of required here.
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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