linux-kernel - Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

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Message-ID: <20111004231730.GB17089@redhat.com>
Date:	Tue, 4 Oct 2011 19:17:30 -0400
From:	"Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@...hat.com>
To:	Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de>
Cc:	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>
Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

Hi -

On Wed, Oct 05, 2011 at 01:39:32AM +0300, Adrian Bunk wrote:

> [...]  But the semantics of PGP key signing is that you certify that
> you verified that a photo ID of that person matches the name on the
> key.  [...]

But that's begging the question.  The semantics are what you want them
to be.  Some keysigning parties take this super seriously, and maybe
with strangers there's some room for this.  But in the end, when *I*
see a key with someone else's signature on it, there is no proof how
rigorously they investigated the person.  The "reliable identity" part
of the web of trust is only one hop deep.

- FChE

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