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Message-ID: <20111005192349.GA14406@localhost.pp.htv.fi>
Date:	Wed, 5 Oct 2011 22:23:49 +0300
From:	Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de>
To:	Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@...hat.com>,
	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>
Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

On Wed, Oct 05, 2011 at 01:06:16PM -0400, Ted Ts'o wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 05, 2011 at 10:54:39AM +0300, Adrian Bunk wrote:
> > 
> > What policy is now used at kernel.org now is exactly the question
> > I asked in [1], and where I'm still waiting for an answer from hpa.
> > 
> > Other organizations like Debian have a clear and public policy on 
> > what is required for the user identification part for uploading to
> > the archive [2], and I expect the same for kernel.org.
> 
> Peter has already said "are you prepared to swear in court".
> Government issued ID is one way (although any US high school student
> knows how easy it is to get fake ID); personal knowledge of someone's
> speach patterns plus common history generated by years of talking to
> that person at conferences and/or concalls, is another way.
> 
> When I bootstrapped Linus's key, he and I talked on the phone, and I
> knew him well enough by our conversation my recognizing his speach
> patterns that I was prepared to certify his key even though I've never
> seen his government ID.  That being said, I also know and trust Jim
> Zemlin well enough to know trust that the person employed by the Linux
> Foundation had his ID and right to work checked per US employment law,
> and and that the person I talked to was the same person who is
> employed by the Linux Foundation.  Realistically, I'm far more sure of
> Linus's identity than I would be of some random Debian developer who
> got his key signed after some quick impromptu verification of what
> appeared to be a governement-issued ID at some conference.  :-)

That was not what I was talking about in the email you are answering to.

Let me paraphrase my question:
"Whose signatures do I need on my key so that it will be accepted
 at kernel.org?"

With that information I can check if one email to a few local people to 
have a local keysigning is enough.

Or if I have to bother Linus to meet me and sign my key the next
time he is here in Helsinki.

> 						- Ted

cu
Adrian

-- 

       "Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out
        of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days.
       "Only a promise," Lao Er said.
                                       Pearl S. Buck - Dragon Seed

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