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Message-ID: <CACqU3MWr5DKAWKydHmJuz=+a3UN3KdtsdXwfE-UxSD5_9tzqag@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2011 16:00:39 -0400
From: Arnaud Lacombe <lacombar@...il.com>
To: Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de>
Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>
Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust
Hi,
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 6:39 PM, Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 04, 2011 at 04:29:48PM -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
>> On Mon, 03 Oct 2011 21:04:41 +0300, Adrian Bunk said:
>> > On Mon, Oct 03, 2011 at 12:28:17PM -0400, Frank Ch. Eigler wrote:
>>
>> > > What is the threat that this passport checking is intended to cure?
>> > > That someone else might have been impersonating Rafael for years,
>> > > sending patches, chatting in email and over the phone, and attending
>> > > conferences?
>> >
>> > Key signing is an identity check.
>>
>> That's dodging the issue. Somehow, I don't see Andrew Morton asking Linus to
>> sign his key, and Linus saying "How do I know you're the *real* Andrew Morton?"
>> And Andrew is a clever guy, if he was a fake Andrew, I'm sure he'd have gotten
>> a fake ID that would be good enough to fool Linus, who is also a clever guy but
>> I'm not aware of any special background he has in forgery detection. ;)
>>
>> The more important point is that as far as the linux-kernel community is
>> concerned, the guy we've all seen show up at conferences and present stuff all
>> these times *is* Andrew Morton, even if his real name is George Q. Smith and
>> he's been on the run for the last 27 years for an embarassing incident
>> involving an ostrich, the mayor's daughter, and 17 gallons of mineral oil in
>> the atrium of the museum. ;)
>>
>> The ID check is to connect an actual person to the claimed key, and primarily
>> intended for key signing parties and the like, where people *don't* know each
>> other very well. I think there's something like 5 people on the linux-kernel
>> list who actually know me in real life, because I don't travel much and I'm
>> rather in the boonies. If I asked anybody *else* who I'd not met before to
>> sign my key, yes, I'd expect them to check my ID, to ensure I wasn't somebody
>> trying to pull a fast one at the keysigning party.
>
> If you just want to be sure that patch number 100 comes from the same
> person as the 99 patches before you could do that without key signing
> (require signed patches and check that all 100 patches were signed by
> the same key).
>
> But the semantics of PGP key signing is that you certify that you
> verified that a photo ID of that person matches the name on the key.
>
> No matter if that's needed for kernel purposes.
> And no matter if it's possible to present you a fake ID.
>
> One might discuss what requirements for access to kernel.org machines make
> sense or not, but when you sign a key you have to check a photo ID first.
>
>> > > If so, perhaps the impostor is of more value to the
>> > > project than the Real Rafael.
>> >
>> > Pseudonymous contributions to the kernel are not allowed.
>>
>> See above - whoever Andrew Morton *really* is, his contributions are hardly
>> pseudonymous.
>
> Each time a patch goes through him into the kernel, he certifies that
> his real name is Andrew Morton.
>
> If that would not be his real name, it would make him somewhere between
> completely untrustable and punishable at court.
>
Under which jurisdiction ? Under which law ?
IANAL, but US copyright law does recognize the use of pseudonym for
copyrighted work[0], without requirements to disclose one's legal
name.
- Arnaud
[0]: http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl101.html
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