linux-kernel - [PATCH 2/2] SELinux: Do not apply MMAP_ZERO check to PROT

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Date:	Fri, 21 Oct 2011 14:39:55 -0700 (PDT)
From:	Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
CC:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] SELinux: Do not apply MMAP_ZERO check to PROT_NONE mappings

An mmap with PROT_NONE is done specifically to ensure that an address
will fault.  So doing this on addresses below CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
is not seeking a "dangerous" operation.  Conversely, it's an attempt
to ensure robustness in case CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR or vm.mmap_min_addr
is less restrictive than the user wants to be.

Since we might let a low mapping exist at all without a check, we
add another check to prevent mprotect from granting access to such
a mapping without passing an MMAP_ZERO security check.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c |   17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 76e6f04..1e3657b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3062,7 +3062,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
 	 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
 	 */
-	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR &&
+	    (addr_only || prot != PROT_NONE)) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
 				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
 		if (rc)
@@ -3091,6 +3092,20 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
+	/*
+	 * Notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
+	 * the secondary cap_file_mprotect check.  This is such a likely attempt
+	 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
+	 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
+	 */
+	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR && prot != PROT_NONE) {
+		u32 sid = current_sid();
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
 	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
 	rc = cap_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot)
 	if (rc)
--
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