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Message-Id: <1320445482-8459-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2011 22:24:36 +0000
From: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Cc: oleg@...hat.com, richard@....at, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
ebiederm@...ssion.com, serge@...lyn.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
eparis@...hat.com
Subject: user namespaces: fix some uid/privilege leaks
The previous submission of these patches, and review comments, can be
seen in the thread starting here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/10/18/463 .
Since then, patches
0001-pid_ns-ensure-pid-is-not-freed-during-kill_pid_info_.patch
and
0002-user-namespace-usb-make-usb-urbs-user-namespace-awar.patch
have gone upstream, and I've reverted
0009-make-net-core-scm.c-uid-comparisons-user-namespace-a.patch
because it relaxes checks, and right now we want to focus on
fixing leaks.
The set includes:
0001-user-namespace-make-signal.c-respect-user-namespaces.patch
This convers the uid for the task sending a signal to the
user namespace of the receiver. It is somewhat analogous
to what is done with the sender's pid.
Waiting on feedback from Oleg, but I believe this patch is
ready.
0002-User-namespace-don-t-allow-sysctl-in-non-init-user-n.patch
This prevents root in a child user namespace from man-handling
sysctls. With this patch, a task in a child user namespace
will only get the world access rights to sysctls.
0003-user-namespace-clamp-down-users-of-cap_raised.patch
This clamps down on cases where privilege to your own user
namespace were checked for access to the initial user namespace.
0004-Add-Documentation-namespaces-user_namespace.txt-v3.patch
Documentation.
0005-user-namespace-make-each-net-net_ns-belong-to-a-user.patch
This adds a struct user_namespace pointer to the net_ns for use
by later patches.
0006-protect-cap_netlink_recv-from-user-namespaces.patch
Now that net_ns is owned by a user_ns, cap_netlink_recv() can
target privilege checks to the user_ns owning the resource. The
current check against current_cap() is unsafe.
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