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Message-ID: <20111105093146.GA14338@albatros>
Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2011 13:31:46 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Luis Henriques <henrix@...andro.org>
Cc: Miles Lane <miles.lane@...il.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Subject: Re: Linus GIT - INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected
(cc'ed Andrew and Alexey)
On Thu, Nov 03, 2011 at 20:49 +0000, Luis Henriques wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 03, 2011 at 11:57:20AM -0400, Miles Lane wrote:
> ...
>
> I'm hitting the exact same problem, using a minimal .config file (can send
> it if required), by just running "find /".
>
> I have bisected the problem and found that commit
> aa6afca5bcaba8101f3ea09d5c3e4100b2b9f0e5 seems to be the cause of it.
procfs holds sig->cred_guard_mutex to ensure the target's credentials are
not changed. It is held for a little timeslice. From the stack trace I
don't understand how sys_execve() can happen with ->cred_guard_mutex
held:
static struct dentry *proc_lookupfd_common(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
instantiate_t instantiate)
{
...
if (lock_trace(task))
goto out;
result = instantiate(dir, dentry, task, &fd);
unlock_trace(task);
...
}
static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task)
{
int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (err)
return err;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)) {
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
proc_lookupfd_common() always exits without ->cred_guard_mutex held.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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